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Abstract
Using a dynamic model of a step-by-step innovation race between financially constrained
firms, I study how financial constraints aﬀect innovation activity. The novel theoretical results
derive from an analysis of the interaction between the incentive eﬀect of competition on inno-
vation and the eﬀect competition has on the degree of credit rationing. I find that the negative
eﬀect of financial constraints on firm- and aggregate-level R&D investment is most pronounced at
both high and low levels of competition. These predictions are supported by empirical evidence:
The competition-innovation relationship has an inverted-U shape in less financially developed
systems relative to the benchmark pattern observed in countries with highly developed financial
systems. Innovation-enhancing policies implemented through competition reforms ought to be
complemented by promoting financial development.
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1 Introduction
Product market competition is the driving force of innovation. Competing firms invest in R&D
in order to innovate and achieve higher market shares or higher total factor productivity growth.1
The competition-to-productivity argument guided reforms ranging from the EU’s ‘Single-Market
Programme’ and product market reforms in other developed countries to the economic transition of
many emerging economies in Central and Eastern Europe or Asia.2 However, competition pressure
may not be suﬃcient for reaching high innovation levels and therefore innovation-enhancing policies
implemented through an increase in competition may fail.
The three most frequently cited obstacles to innovation by firms in the European Community
Innovation Surveys are high cost of innovation, lack of financing, and economic risk.3 According
to the surveys, large firms are more innovative than small firms by a factor of three to four when
innovativeness is measured by R&D spending. A smaller proportion of large firms also reports
lack of financing among the most significant obstacles to innovation. These survey findings are
consistent with small firms finding it more diﬃcult to raise external finance,4 fund R&D projects,
and therefore innovating less. Access to external finance may be one of the key determinants of
innovation success. As innovation activities typically involve intangible assets, are complex, and
carry high risk, the quality of the financial system is likely to be important for securing outside
1See Aghion, Harris, Howitt, and Vickers (2001); Blundell, Griﬃth, and Van Reenen (1999); Nickell (1996); or,
more recently, Griﬃth, Harrison, and Simpson (2006).
2See Buigues, Ilzkovitz, and Lebrun (1990) for the EU; Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2005) for OECD countries; Bolton
and Roland (1992), Boubakri, Cosset, and Guedhami (2004), Djankov and Murrell (2002), Li (1999), or Roland (2001)
for emerging economies.
3See Jaumotte and Pain (2005a, 2005b).
4See Beck and Demirgüç-Kunt (2006) and Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Maksimovic (2005) for evidence that the
eﬀect financial development has on a firm’s growth is strongest for the smallest companies. Berger and Udell (2006)
devise a framework to study the financing of small and medium enterprises.
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financing for high-technology companies, especially in their early stage, and therefore for achieving
high innovation levels.5
To understand what role external finance plays in R&D, I develop a theory of innovation that
examines how the interaction between competition and financial constraints determines R&D ac-
tivity and test the predictions of my theory empirically. Specifically, I extend the dynamic model
of the step-by-step innovation race of Aghion, Bloom, Blundell, Griﬃth, and Howitt (2005), who
analyze how competition aﬀects aggregate innovation activity. In Aghion et al. (2005), firms inno-
vate by spending eﬀort that is unbounded, and they incur no financial cost while innovating. Their
analysis thus omits finance, potentially a very important element in a theory of innovation. The
novel feature I add to the current theory of competition and innovation is that firms innovate by
investing cash in R&D and, due to financial frictions, face financial constraints limiting their ability
to raise external finance and therefore to invest.
In the model of the step-by-step innovation race, competition drives incentives to innovate by
technology leaders and followers. Specifically, the innovation incentives of technology leaders and
followers depend upon the diﬀerence between post- and pre-innovation rents. If competition reduces
pre-innovation rents, it increases the incremental payoﬀ from innovating and encourages R&D
investments aimed at ‘escaping competition’. In contrast, if competition reduces post-innovation
rents, it discourages innovation (this is the so-called Schumpeterian eﬀect). When I introduce
financial constraints into this framework, competition interacts with financial constraints so that
two new ways in which competition aﬀects innovation activity emerge: the ‘lack-of-internal funds
eﬀect’ and the ‘strategic eﬀect’. Intuitively, the two eﬀects work as follows.
First, competition–through altering profits and hence internal funds–limits the amount firms
5In their analysis of the Alternative Investment Market (AIM) of the London Stock Exchange, Arcot, Black, and
Owen (2007) show that AIM has become an important source of funding for early-stage high-technology companies
internationally. They argue that the key driver behind AIM’s success and growth is the fact that AIM is embedded
in the cluster of skills, experience, and resources which has been built up in the City over many years.
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can invest in R&D on their own. Therefore, in the absence of frictionless financial market, firms
may not invest optimally, i.e., according to the diﬀerence between post- and pre-innovation rents
determined by competition, as their internal funds may be insuﬃcient. The non-trivial dual eﬀect
of competition on innovation incentives through rents and, at the same time, internal funds and
the degree of credit rationing has not been explored to date. I develop this idea into a structural
model of the wedge between the optimal unconstrained and constrained-feasible R&D investment
in which the fundamental parameter is competition.
Second, competition–by aﬀecting how much firms can invest in R&D as well as how much they
would like to invest–determines which firms are constrained and which are not. In industry equilib-
rium, firms choose their R&D strategies depending on whether their competitors are constrained or
not. Constrained competitors are forced to invest less in R&D, which increases the post-innovation
rents of unconstrained firms, and hence gives them extra innovation incentives. In other words,
unconstrained firms react strategically to the fact that their competitors are constrained by in-
creasing their R&D investment. As a result, there is a new channel through which competition sets
incentives to innovate; in addition to the direct eﬀect through rents, there is an indirect strategic
eﬀect.
I show that the eﬀect of competition on aggregate innovation intensity diﬀers depending on
whether firms have frictionless access to external finance or are subject to financial constraints. In
the presence of constraints, the wedge between the first-best and financially-constrained aggregate
innovation intensity is positive at both intense and very relaxed levels of competition. When I com-
pare the steady state equilibria of industries with very intense and extremely intense (very relaxed
and extremely relaxed) competition levels, the wedge is larger in industries with more extreme com-
petition levels. The intuition behind these results is as follows. When intensely competing firms
employ the same technology, they aim at high R&D investments in order to ‘escape competition’
by innovating and securing monopoly rents as technology leaders. At the same time, the intensely
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competing firms have low internal funds so the wedge between the preferred and feasible R&D
investment is large when external finance is not available. A diﬀerent intuition explains the sur-
prising positive wedge when competition is relaxed. Technology laggards have stronger incentives
to invest in R&D when their post-innovation rents, i.e., the rents achieved after matching current
technology leaders, is high. This is when competition between firms operating the same technology
is relaxed. Without frictionless access to external finance, the laggards’ profits might be too low to
allow high R&D investment induced by relaxed competition and the positive wedge arises. These
results are consistent with the interpretation provided by Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen (1988,
2000) and contested by Kaplan and Zingales (1997, 2000) for a positive correlation between cash
flow and investment.6 More interestingly, my model can be used to guide empirical tests in this
area: R&D-cash flow sensitivity is particularly strong when competition is very intense and very
relaxed.
The theory of innovation closest to my model is that of Aghion, Dewatripont, and Rey (1999)
who analyze the incentive eﬀects of competition and financial market discipline on growth when firms
are non profit-maximizing. They model the finance-incentive channel as a corporate governance
mechanism of financial markets that elicits innovation activity from slacking managers by enforcing
financial contracts and denying renegotiation.7 However, their analysis leaves out the eﬀect of
competition on the degree of credit rationing, the central argument of my model. In contrast to
Aghion, Dewatripont, and Rey (1999), I show that finance has real consequences for innovation
even if firms are profit-maximizing. In another related study, Povel and Raith (2004) build on
6Cleary, Povel, and Raith (2007) conduct an extensive theoretical and empirical analysis of the investment-cash
flow sensitivity problem and explain why the two literatures arrive at opposite results. Riddick and Whited (2008)
document how diﬃcult it is to assess the cost of external finance based on a firm’s saving behavior.
7Köke and Renneboog (2005) investigate the eﬀect of corporate governance and competition on productivity growth
empirically. Giroud and Mueller (2007, 2008) verify that firms in non-competitive industries benefit relatively more
from good corporate governance.
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an extensive industrial organization literature8 to analyze the interaction of financing and output
market decisions in a static duopoly framework in which one firm is financially constrained and
can borrow to finance production costs. They derive debt as an optimal contract and find that,
compared with a situation in which both firms are unconstrained, the financially constrained firm
produces less while its unconstrained rival produces more. The mechanism of my model is diﬀerent
from Povel and Raith (2004) in that I use a dynamic model of innovation race in which competition
drives R&D investments of individual firms, the firms’ investments determine the aggregate industry
structure, and the industry structure feeds back into firms’ individual decisions.9 The focus of my
analysis is to compare steady state equilibria when competing firms have frictionless access to
external finance with those when firms are financially constrained.
To empirically test the predictions of my theory, I examine whether the competition-innovation
pattern varies across countries with diﬀerent levels of financial development.10 Financial devel-
opment plays a key role in overcoming market frictions, which represent a fundamental source of
external finance cost and give rise to financial constraints.11 Financial development proxies the
presence of financial constraints at the country level. Applying a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences method-
ology on cross-industry, cross-country European data from the period 1995-2004, I ask whether,
for example, Italian financial institutions diﬀer significantly from those of the UK in their ability
to provide external finance to firms in industries with very intense and very relaxed competition
8The eﬀect of exogenously imposed debt on product market decisions is studied in, e.g., Brander and Lewis (1986)
or Chevalier and Scharfstein (1996). More recently, Faure-Grimaud (2000) and Maurer (1999) use models where
financial contracting is optimally determined together with product market decisions.
9Akdog˘u and MacKay (2008) empirically investigate how industry structure aﬀects firms’ investment decisions by
changing the value of the real options they face.
10Aghion et al. (2005) investigate the shape of the relationship between competition and innovation and find an
inverted-U pattern using a two-digit SIC industry panel of 354 industry-year observations based on an unbalanced
panel of 311 UK firms.
11See the survey by Levine (1997).
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levels relative to their ability to provide external finance to firms in industries with intermediate
competition levels.
Using industries with intermediate competition levels as the benchmark group, there is strong
evidence of a disproportionate positive eﬀect of financial development on R&D investment in in-
dustries where competition is very intense. The corresponding evidence for industries where com-
petition is relaxed is weaker, but I still find that R&D investment is disproportionately lower in
countries with low financial development compared to countries with highly developed financial
systems. In other words, the competition-innovation relationship has an inverted-U shape in less
financially developed systems relative to the benchmark pattern observed in countries with highly
developed financial systems.
These findings add to an extensive literature on the finance-growth nexus12 and suggest a new
mechanism for how financial development promotes growth. Financial development helps corporate
growth as better financial systems allow financing of firms that invest in R&D projects independently
of their industry’s current profitability determined by competition.
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section develops the theory of innovation based on com-
petition and financial constraints and derives testable predictions. Section 3 explains the empirical
model and presents results. Section 4 concludes. Proofs are in the Appendix.
2 A Theory of Innovation Based on Competition and Financial
Constraints
2.1 Model
Using a dynamic model of a step-by-step innovation race between financially constrained firms, I
analyze how product market competition aﬀects innovation activity. The economy has a continuum
12See King and Levine (1993), Rajan and Zingales (1998), Fisman and Love (2004), or Bena and Jurajda (2007).
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of industries indexed by i ∈ [0, 1]. Each industry is a duopoly with respect to production and
innovation. The duopolists participate in an innovation race and maximize the expected discounted
sum of profits from supplying their goods to consumers over an infinite horizon. Time is continuous
and the unit mass of identical and infinitely-lived consumers have preferences
U ≡
Z ∞
0
½Z 1
0
lnYi(t)di− L(t)
¾
e−rtdt,
where Yi(t) is the output of industry i at date t, L(t) is labor supplied at date t, and 1 > r > 0 is the
rate of time preference. The micro-model of the interaction between duopolists is analogous to that
of Aghion, Bloom, Blundell, Griﬃth, and Howitt (2002). The logarithmic preferences imply that,
in equilibrium, consumers spend a constant proportion of income on the output of each industry i
at all dates t. The demand functions facing the two firms in any industry i depend on the degree of
substitutability between the two goods duopolists produce. Each firm takes the wage as given and
produces output using labor as the only input according to a constant-returns-to-scale production
function. The unit costs of production of the two firms are independent of the quantities produced.
There is an infinite sequence of technology levels k = 0, 1, 2, .... Each firm engages in R&D
in order to acquire the next technology level. The technological advantage decreases the firm’s
unit cost of production relative to its competitor. The state of an industry is described by the
pair of technology levels (k, k −m) of a current industry leader and a laggard. m is the laggard’s
technological gap. To obtain a closed-form solution, I assume that the technological gap between the
firms cannot exceed one level.13 At any date t, an industry is in one of two states: neck-and-neck,
m = 0; or unleveled, m = 1.
The equilibrium profit of each firm depends on the relative unit production cost of the two firms,
13The knowledge spillover between the leader and the laggard is such that if the firm, which is already one step
ahead, innovates, the lagging firm automatically learns the leader’s previous technology. Aghion et al. (2005) use
the same assumption. Aghion et al. (2001) analyze the case when m > 1 and show that the main conclusions are
qualitatively equivalent to the one-lag model.
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the degree of substitutability between the two goods, and the nature of product market competition.
Similarly to Aghion et al. (2005), I follow the reduced-form approach and define π1 (π−1) to be
the profit flow of the leader (the laggard) in the unleveled state and π0 to be the profit flow of
each firm in the neck-and-neck state, where π1 ≥ π0 ≥ π−1 > 0 and Π ≡ π1 − π−1 > 0. Note
that the monopoly rent brought about by technological leadership Π is independent of the leader’s
technology level k.14
The intensity of competition is modeled as the degree to which the two firms in the neck-and-
neck state are able to collude against consumers, which is captured by parameter ∆ ∈
£
1
2 , 1
¤
in the
profit flow π0 ≡ π−1 + (1 −∆)Π.15 If competition is intense, ∆ = 1, each firm earns profit flow
π−1 equal to the laggard’s profit flow in the unleveled state. In the opposite case, if competition is
relaxed, ∆ = 12 , each firm earns profit flow π−1+
1
2Π as the two firms share, in the same proportion,
a collusion rent equal to the monopoly rent derived from technological leadership Π.16
Moving one technological step ahead happens at the rate determined by the amount of cash
invested in R&D. In the unleveled state, if the laggard invests y in R&D he innovates and catches
up with the leader with a Poisson hazard rate (‘innovation intensity’)
√
y+h. Parameter 1 > h ≥ 0
captures the intensity of the innovation spillover eﬀect.17 The leader does not invest in R&D as she
14As discussed in Aghion, Harris, and Vickers (1997), in a variety of product market competition settings–including
Bertrand and Cournot–firms’ equilibrium profit flows depend only on the technological gap and not on the technology
level.
15An increase in the degree of substitutability between the two goods leads to an analogous reduced-form parame-
terization of profit flow π0.
16For simplicity, in the version of the model presented here, the monopoly rent derived from technological leadership
Π is independent of competition (i.e., the advantage of a cost reduction achieved by innovation does not depend on
competition). As argued in Boone (2008), more intense competition (brought about by more aggressive interaction
among existing firms) makes more eﬃcient firms benefit disproportionately more relative to less eﬃcient firms, which
means that Π increases with competition. This reinforces the model’s predictions: The wedge between the first-best
and financially-constrained aggregate innovation intensity is even higher.
17The predictions of the model about the eﬀect of financial constraints on innovation activity do not depend on
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derives no advantage by innovating. In the neck-and-neck state, by investing x in R&D each firm
moves one technological step ahead (becomes the leader) with innovation intensity
√
x.
Finally, I assume that the firms have no access to external finance. In both states, no firm
can invest more than its current profit, x ≤ π0 and y ≤ π−1.18 This assumption is strong for two
reasons. Firms cannot transfer cash across states of the industry, and they do not have access to
any risk-sharing technology (financial system) that allows cash transfers across industries. To study
the model including these characteristics is interesting, but not the focus of this paper. This paper
answers the question: What is the consequence of financial constraints for innovation activity?
Therefore, I contrast the first-best equilibria derived when financial constraints are not present
(e.g., when firms decide their R&D investments based on their incentives only) with corresponding
equilibria under no access to external finance.
2.2 Unconstrained Equilibrium
I analyze the symmetric stationary Markov equilibrium. Proposition 1 presents the equilibrium
R&D investment x (y) in the neck-and-neck (the unleveled) state which solves each neck-and-neck
firm’s (the laggard’s) optimization problem ignoring the financial constraints.
Proposition 1 1. In the neck-and-neck state, each firm invests
x =
³p
(h+ r)2 +∆Π− (h+ r)
´2
.
2. In the unleveled state, the laggard invests
y =
³p
(h+ r)2 +∆Π−
p
(h+ r)2 +Π+ x
´2
.
whether the innovation spillover eﬀect is present or not. As existing literature typically studies this class of models
including the innovation spillover, I solve the model when h > 0.
18 I assume the simplest form of financial constraints. No results are changed if firms can only invest a fraction of
their profits: x ≤ απ0 and y ≤ βπ−1, where α ∈ (0, 1], β ∈ (0, 1].
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In the next Corollary, I present comparative static properties of equilibrium R&D investments x
and y with respect to the intensity of competition, technological leadership rent, innovation spillover
intensity, and rate of time preference.
Corollary 1 1. In the neck-and-neck state, each firm’s R&D investment satisfies
∂x
∂∆
> 0,
∂x
∂Π
> 0,
∂x
∂h
< 0, and
∂x
∂r
< 0.
2. In the unleveled state, the laggard’s R&D investment satisfies
∂y
∂∆
< 0,
∂y
∂Π
> 0,
∂y
∂h
< 0, and
∂y
∂r
< 0.
In the neck-and-neck state, an increase in competition decreases current profit π0 and increases
the incremental payoﬀ from innovating for fixed π1. Therefore, the incentive to innovate and the
R&D investment of each firm in the neck-and-neck state increases with competition–the ‘escape-
competition’ eﬀect (Aghion, Harris, and Vickers, 1997).19 In contrast, the laggard’s R&D invest-
ment decreases with competition. This is because for a given technological leadership rent Π, the
laggard’s incentive to innovate increases with profit π0 he gets when he catches up with the leader.
As profit π0 decreases if competition intensifies, more intense competition lowers the incremental
payoﬀ from successful innovation and disincentivizes R&D investment (the so-called Schumpeterian
eﬀect).
In both states, the firms’ R&D investments increase with the technological leadership rent and
decrease with the innovation spillover intensity and rate of time preference. The former result
obtains because the diﬀerence between the value of being the leader and the laggard increases with
the technological leadership rent. The latter result obtains because an increase in the innovation
19 In the extreme case, when∆ = 1, the profit of each firm in the neck-and-neck state is π0 = π−1 and the incremental
payoﬀ from a successful innovation is Π. In contrast, when ∆ = 1
2
, the profit of each firm in the neck-and-neck state
is π0 = π−1 + 12Π as each firm already enjoys a collusion rent equal to half of the technological leadership rent. In
this case, the incremental payoﬀ from successful innovation is only 1
2
Π.
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spillover intensity (the rate of time preference) crowds out incentives to innovate by investing in
R&D in both states (lowers payoﬀs from innovating through heavier discounting).
As the economy has a continuum of industries of mass one and each industry is either in the
unleveled or in the neck-and-neck state, the aggregate innovation intensity is the weighted sum
of the two firms’ innovation intensities in the neck-and-neck state and the laggard’s innovation
intensity in the unleveled state, I ≡ 2λ
√
x + (1 − λ)
¡√
y + h
¢
. Weights λ and (1 − λ) are the
fractions of industries in the two states, respectively. Fraction λ is endogenous as it depends on
the firms’ R&D investments in the two states. Corollary 2 presents the steady state20 equilibrium
aggregate innovation intensity as a function of R&D investments x and y, as well as its comparative
static properties with respect to the intensity of competition and innovation spillover intensity.
Corollary 2 1. The aggregate innovation intensity is
I =
4
√
x
¡√
y + h
¢
2
√
x+
√
y + h
.
2. When the innovation spillover eﬀect is absent, the aggregate innovation intensity decreases
with competition: ∂I∂∆ < 0 when h = 0.
3. When the innovation spillover intensity is suﬃciently high, the competition-aggregate inno-
vation relationship has an inverted-U shape: ∂I∂∆ > 0 for ∆ ∈
£
1
2 ,∆peak
¢
and ∂I∂∆ < 0 for
∆ ∈ (∆peak, 1].
4. The aggregate innovation intensity has an inverted-U shape with respect to the innovation
spillover intensity: ∂I∂h > 0 for h ∈ [0, hpeak) and
∂I
∂h < 0 for ∆ ∈ (hpeak, 1].21
Aggregate innovation intensity I is established as an endogenous combination of the ‘escape-
competition’ and the Schumpeterian eﬀects that drive firm-level R&D investments in the two states.
20 In the steady state, the flow of industries from the neck-and-neck state to the unleveled state matches the opposite
flow, 2λ
√
x = (1− λ)
¡√
y + h
¢
.
21Explicit formulas for threshold quantities ∆peak and hpeak are in Appendix C.
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If there is no innovation spillover eﬀect (h = 0), most industries are in the unleveled state in which
only the Schumpeterian eﬀect operates, and the aggregate innovation intensity always decreases with
competition. A positive innovation spillover eﬀect (h > 0) makes more industries switch from the
unleveled to the neck-and-neck state and the Schumpeterian eﬀect no longer dominates. When the
innovation spillover intensity is suﬃciently high, the fraction of industries that are in the neck-and-
neck state is high enough for the ‘escape-competition’ eﬀect to win over the Schumpeterian eﬀect.
The ‘escape-competition’ eﬀect wins earlier if competition is low as, in this case, the laggards invest
a lot in R&D which pushes the fraction of industries that are in the neck-and-neck state further
up. As a result, the aggregate innovation intensity increases with competition at low competition
levels while it decreases with competition at high competition levels.22
Interestingly, despite the fact that the firms’ R&D investments are decreasing in the innovation
spillover intensity in both states, the aggregate innovation intensity has an inverted-U shape with
respect to h. This result obtains because higher innovation spillover intensity reduces the firms’
incentives to invest in R&D in both states, but the laggard innovates more often for any R&D
investment level. At low levels of innovation spillover intensity, most industries are in the unleveled
state where only the laggards invest in R&D. In this case, if the innovation spillover intensity
increases, the negative eﬀect on the laggards’ incentives to invest in R&D is dominated by their
extra innovating due to a higher innovation spillover. As a result, the aggregate innovation intensity
increases if the innovation spillover eﬀect increases from an initially low level. At high levels of
innovation spillover intensity, more industries are in the neck-and-neck state where both firms
invest in R&D and–as they employ the same technology–do not innovate due to the innovation
spillover eﬀect. Therefore, if the innovation spillover intensity is high and increases, the negative
eﬀect on incentives to invest in R&D dominates and the aggregate innovation intensity decreases.
22This confirms Aghion et al.’s (2005) competition-innovation inverted-U result. Interestingly, the necessary con-
dition for the inverted-U is h > 0. I verified that the same necessary condition is present in Aghion et al. (2005).
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2.3 Binding Financial Constraints
In the previous section, I solved for the equilibrium in the absence of financial constraints. Propo-
sition 2 characterizes the parameter space for which the unconstrained equilibrium of Proposition
1 does not exist as the financial constraints are violated, i.e., x > π0 or y > π−1.
Proposition 2 1. In the neck-and-neck state, each firm’s R&D investment exceeds profit, x >
π0, if and only if
π−1 <
π1
2
and
π1
2Π
< ∆ and h+ r <
2∆Π− π1
2
√
π1 −∆Π
.
The necessary condition for x > π0 is ∆ > ∆, where ∆ is the competition level at which the
financial constraint of a firm in the neck-and-neck state is just satisfied
∆ ≡
π1 + (h+ r)
³p
(h+ r)2 + 2π1 − (h+ r)
´
2Π
.
2. In the unleveled state, when h = 0 and r = 0, the laggard’s R&D investment exceeds profit,
y > π−1, if and only ifÃ
π−1 <
2−
√
2
4
π1
!
or
Ã
π−1 =
2−
√
2
4
π1 and ∆ < 1
!
orÃ
2−
√
2
4
π1 < π−1 <
3−
√
3
6
π1 and ∆ <
(Π− π−1)2
4π−1Π
!
.
When h+ r > 0, the necessary condition for y > π−1 is ∆ < ∆, where ∆ is the competition
level at which the laggard’s financial constraint is just satisfied
∆ ≡
(Π− π−1)2 + 4(h+ r)2
£
Π− 2π−1 − 2(h+ r)
√
π−1
¤
4
¡√
π−1 + h+ r
¢2Π .
Since firms’ R&D investments are increasing in the technological leadership rent in both states,
a high-enough leadership rent is suﬃcient for the firms’ financial constraints to become binding. In
contrast, the eﬀect of competition on financial constraints is opposite in the two states. A firm in
the neck-and-neck state becomes financially constrained if competition is intense enough, while the
laggard’s financial constraint is binding when competition is relaxed. This follows from the fact that
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the R&D investment of a firm in the neck-and-neck state (of the laggard) increases (decreases) with
competition and therefore it hits the limit set by the profit at a high (low) competition level. In
Proposition 2, I present the threshold competition intensities∆ (∆) at which the financial constraint
of the laggard (of a firm in the neck-and-neck state) is just satisfied.
Quantities ∆ and ∆ split all admissible competition levels into three regions: (i) The relaxed
competition region, ∆ ∈
£
1
2 ,∆
¤
, in which the laggard is financially constrained; (ii) The intermediate
competition region, ∆ ∈ (∆,∆), in which the unconstrained equilibrium of Proposition 1 exists;
(iii) The intense competition region, ∆ ∈ [∆, 1], in which the firms in the neck-and-neck state are
constrained. The necessary and suﬃcient condition for the existence of these three competition
regions, i.e., 12 < ∆ < ∆ < 1, is stated in Appendix C while proving Proposition 2.
An increase in the innovation spillover intensity (in the rate of time preference) makes the
financial constraints binding for a smaller set of competition levels in both states (∆ decreases and
∆ increases). This is because, for given profits π1, π−1 and competition level ∆, a higher innovation
spillover intensity (rate of time preference) decreases the firms’ R&D investments in both states.
Similarly, an increase in π1 (or a decrease in π−1) makes the set of competition levels for which the
financial constraints are binding larger.23
To summarize, the eﬀect of a competition increase (decrease) on the degree to which firms’ finan-
cial constraints are binding is non-trivial. Technology laggards become less (more) constrained while
firms operating similar technology become more (less) constrained. These results are illustrated in
Figure 1.
23See the proof of Proposition 2 in Appendix C for a complete comparative static analysis of threshold intensities
∆ and ∆.
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2.4 Financially Constrained Equilibrium
In this section, I describe the firms’ equilibrium R&D investments and the equilibrium aggregate
innovation intensity in the presence of financial constraints. Proposition 3 presents the equilibrium
R&D investments which solve the optimization problem of a firm in the neck-and-neck state and
the optimization problem of the laggard when their financial constraints are binding.
Proposition 3 Consider the model under the set of parameters {π1, π−1, h, r} such that 12 < ∆ <
∆ < 1.
1. In the relaxed competition region, ∆ ∈
£
1
2 ,∆
¤
, the laggard’s R&D investment is yc = π−1,
while each firm in the neck-and-neck state invests xu.
2. In the intense competition region, ∆ ∈ [∆, 1], the laggard’s R&D investment is yu, while each
firm in the neck-and-neck state invests xc = π0.24
In Corollary 3, I compare R&D investments xu and yu with their counterparts derived in the
case of no financial constraints (Proposition 1).
Corollary 3 Consider the model under the set of parameters {π1, π−1, h, r} such that 12 < ∆ <
∆ < 1.
1. In the relaxed competition region, ∆ ∈
£
1
2 ,∆
¤
, each firm’s R&D investment in the neck-and-
neck state satisfies
xu > x for ∆ ∈
∙
1
2
,∆
¶
and xu = x at ∆ = ∆.
2. In the intense competition region, ∆ ∈ [∆, 1], the laggard’s R&D investment satisfies
yu > y for ∆ ∈
¡
∆, 1
¤
and yu = y at ∆ = ∆.
Relative to the model of section 2.2 with no financial constraints, the laggard’s R&D investment
has to be lower in the relaxed competition region as his financial constraint binds. This decreases
24Explicit formulas xu and yu are in Appendix C.
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the probability that the laggard catches up with the leader, and that means the industry is in
the unleveled state with a higher probability at any point in time, which increases (decreases)
the value of being the leader (the laggard) for given π1, π−1, h, and r. For the same reason,
the incremental payoﬀ from becoming the leader (the laggard) if a firm is currently in the neck-
and-neck state increases (decreases) and therefore its R&D investment is higher, xu > x. At the
threshold competition intensity ∆, the R&D investment of each firm in the neck-and-neck state
is the same as in the case with no financial constraints, xu = x. The laggard’s incentive is to
maximize the probability of leaving the unleveled state, his financial constraint is binding, and his
R&D investment is limited at yc = π−1 for all ∆ ∈
£
1
2 ,∆
¤
.
The presence of financial constraints changes the way competition aﬀects the firms’ R&D in-
vestments. Within the relaxed competition region, a higher competition level does not make the
laggard invest less in R&D. His financial constraint is binding and he invests all his profit–the
Schumpeterian eﬀect of higher competition does not unfold. In contrast, the ‘escape-competition’
eﬀect of the neck-and-neck state is stronger in comparison to the case with no financial constraints,
as the incremental payoﬀ achieved when a firm becomes the leader is higher.
A similar intuition works when firms in the neck-and-neck state are constrained. Relative to
the no-financial-constraints model, the R&D investment of each firm in the neck-and-neck state
has to be lower within the intense competition region as their financial constraints are binding.
Lower neck-and-neck state R&D investment means that the industry is in this state with a higher
probability at any point in time. For given π1, π−1, h, and r, this increases the incremental payoﬀ
of the laggard from switching into the neck-and-neck state and therefore induces him to invest more
in R&D, yu > y. At the threshold competition intensity ∆, the laggard’s R&D investment is the
same as in the case with no financial constraints, yu = y. The laggard’s extra incentive to switch
to the neck-and-neck state and to increase his R&D investment above y is lower the higher the
competition level. This is because intense competition reduces π0 and makes the neck-and-neck
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state less desirable. The value of a firm in the neck-and-neck state is lower, the bigger the deviation
of its R&D investment from the optimal unconstrained level. Therefore, the financial constraints
in the neck-and-neck state are binding and the equilibrium R&D investment of each firm is limited
at xc = π0 for all ∆ ∈ [∆, 1].
In contrast to the case without financial constraints, a higher competition level within the intense
competition region is associated with lower R&D investments of firms in the neck-and-neck state.
These firms want to invest a lot to escape very high competition but, as π0 decreases with com-
petition, they have only a small amount of cash available, which makes the eﬀect of a competition
increase particularly strong. The wedge between the no-financial-constraints and the financially-
constrained R&D investment is larger the closer the competition level is to its maximum level. The
presence of financial constraints in the neck-and-neck state reverses the ‘escape-competition’ eﬀect.
Quantities xu, xc, yu, and yc are presented in Figure 2. The R&D investment of a firm in the
neck-and-neck state (the laggard) in the relaxed competition region, xu (yc), is depicted using the
red (light) solid lines in the top (bottom) right graph of Figure 2. The same two graphs depict
the R&D investment of a firm in the neck-and-neck state (the laggard) in the intense competition
region, xc (yu). Finally, for ease of comparison, the blue (dark) dashed lines depict the corresponding
optimal R&D investments in the no-financial-constraints model.
Corollary 4 presents the steady state equilibrium aggregate innovation intensity as a function of
R&D investments xu and yc (xc and yu) in the relaxed (intense) competition region. It also compares
the aggregate innovation intensity with the one derived in the case of no financial constraints
(Corollary 2).
Corollary 4 Consider the model under the set of parameters {π1, π−1, h, r} such that 12 < ∆ <
∆ < 1.
1. In the relaxed competition region, ∆ ∈
£
1
2 ,∆
¤
, the aggregate innovation intensity is I{xu,yc} =
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4
√
xu(
√
yc+h)
2
√
xu+
√
yc+h
and satisfies
I{xu,yc} < I for ∆ ∈
∙
1
2
,∆
¶
and I{xu,yc} = I at ∆ = ∆.
2. In the intense competition region, ∆ ∈ [∆, 1], the aggregate innovation intensity is I{xc,yu} =
4
√
xc(
√
yu+h)
2
√
xc+
√
yu+h
and satisfies
I{xc,yu} < I for ∆ ∈
¡
∆, 1
¤
and I{xc,yu} = I at ∆ = ∆.
The aggregate innovation intensities I{xu,yc} and I{xc,yu} are derived using the steady state
condition that the flow of industries from the neck-and-neck state to the unleveled state matches
the opposite flow. The flows are determined by the firms’ R&D investments {xu, yc} and {xc, yu} in
the relaxed and the intense competition region, respectively. The aggregate innovation intensities
I{xu,yc} and I{xc,yu} are strictly below the unconstrained aggregate innovation intensity inside both
extreme competition regions and are equal to it at the threshold competition levels ∆ and ∆.
Quantities I, I{xu,yc}, and I{xc,yu} are displayed in the top left graph of Figure 2. The blue
inverted-U line which depicts the aggregate innovation intensity of the model with no financial
constraints has three segments: The solid middle part, where the unconstrained equilibrium of
Proposition 1 exists; and the two dashed parts, which depict the aggregate innovation intensity of
Corollary 2 ignoring financial constraints. The aggregate innovation intensities of the model with
financial constraints are depicted in the same graph using solid red lines in both constrained regions:
I{xu,yc} for ∆ ∈
£
1
2 ,∆
¤
and I{xc,yu} for ∆ ∈ [∆, 1].
When I compare the steady state equilibria of industries with very intense and extremely intense
(very relaxed and extremely relaxed) competition levels, the wedge between the unconstrained and
the financially constrained aggregate innovation intensity is larger in the industries with extreme
levels. The competition-innovation relationship has a more pronounced inverted-U shape in the
presence of financial constraints. The wedge is especially marked if the competition level is close
to its maximum. In this case, the R&D investments of both firms in the neck-and-neck state are
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severely constrained by their low profits. The result of low R&D investments is that many industries
are in the neck-and-neck state, thus many industries invest only a small amount in R&D, and the
aggregate innovation intensity is very low. Without access to external finance the firms are trapped
in the neck-and-neck state and the economy is in high competition, low profit, and low innovation
equilibrium.
The negative direct eﬀect of financial constraints on aggregate innovation intensity is partially
oﬀset by the fact that the unconstrained firm strategically increases its R&D investment if it faces
a constrained competitor. To illustrate the magnitude of this eﬀect, the top left graph of Figure 2
also depicts (red dashed lines) the aggregate innovation intensities under the assumption that the
unconstrained firm does not change its R&D investment in response to the fact that its competitor
is constrained.25
Finally, to facilitate intuition on how the firms’ R&D investments are combined into the ag-
gregate innovation intensity in industry equilibrium, the bottom left graph of Figure 2 shows the
equilibrium probabilities of an industry to be in the neck-and-neck state as a function of competition.
2.5 Testable Predictions
The main aggregate-level prediction follows from Corollary 4, which states that the eﬀect of compe-
tition on aggregate innovation intensity diﬀers depending on whether firms have frictionless access
to external finance or are subject to financial constraints. In the presence of constraints, there is a
positive wedge between the first-best and financially-constrained aggregate innovation intensity at
both intense and very relaxed levels of competition. In addition, when I compare the steady state
equilibria of industries with very intense and extremely intense (very relaxed and extremely relaxed)
25The red dashed lines show the aggregate innovation intensity determined as follows. For ∆ ∈
£
1
2
,∆
¤
, the laggard
invests yc = π−1 and each firm in the neck-and-neck state invests x (part one of Proposition 1). For ∆ ∈ [∆, 1], each
firm in the neck-and-neck state invests xc = π0 and the laggard invests y (part two of Proposition 1).
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competition levels, the wedge is larger in industries with more extreme competition levels. Empiri-
cally, one can contrast the competition-innovation pattern across economies with/without financial
constraints, e.g., across countries with highly- and less developed financial systems. Specifically, the
slope of the competition-innovation pattern in less financially developed systems is steeper relative
to the benchmark observed in countries with highly developed financial systems for very relaxed as
well as intense competition levels. The slope is the same at intermediate competition levels (see the
top left graph of Figure 2). This prediction is tested in section 3.
In addition, there are multiple micro-level predictions that are testable if one is able to (i)
empirically distinguish the neck-and-neck from the unleveled industries; (ii) measure innovation at
the firm level; and (iii) identify financially constrained firms. First, the model has predictions about
firms in industries with low productivity dispersion (firms in the neck-and-neck state) and high
competition (the intense competition region according to the notation of my model). When firms
in such industries have frictionless access to external finance, higher competition is associated with
higher innovation (part one of Corollary 1), while the opposite holds if the same firms are financially
constrained (part two of Proposition 3). Second, the model has predictions about relatively low-
productive firms in industries with high productivity dispersion (laggards in the unleveled state)
and low competition (the relaxed competition region of my model). When firms in such industries
have frictionless access to external finance, higher competition is associated with lower innovation
(part two of Corollary 1), while innovation does not change with competition if the same firms are
financially constrained (part one of Proposition 3). I test the firm-level predictions in Bena (2008)
using European Patent Oﬃce data matched with financial statements from the Amadeus database
for the period 1997-2005.
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3 Empirical Analysis
In this section I explain the empirical model, describe the data, and present the results from testing
whether the aggregate predictions of the theory are consistent with real data.
3.1 Methodology
Consistent with the theory, my empirical approach maintains that the primary channel through
which competition aﬀects innovation is economic rent.26 Rents are determined by competition, but
they also depend on productivity which is driven by innovation (Griﬃth, Harrison, and Simpson,
2006). Therefore, trying to disentangle the eﬀect of competition on innovation empirically raises a
fundamental identification problem: one needs to isolate the part of variation in competition that
is unrelated to innovation. I address the endogeneity by using a set of instruments that provides an
exogenous variation in the degree of competitiveness across industries and countries. The instru-
ments indicate (ex-ante) the industry-country pairs expected to be aﬀected by introduction of the
EU’s product market reform (‘single market’ launched in 1993) because of the pre-existing barriers
to competition. The corresponding empirical model is
R&Dict = α1 + β1 · ϕ (Marginict) + ηi + γc + δt + ζict (1a)
Marginict = α2 + SMP
0
ic · β2 + ηi + γc + δt + εict, (1b)
26Existing empirical work also uses economic rent: Gorodnichenko, Švejnar, and Terrell (2007), Griﬃth, Harrison,
and Simpson (2006), Nickell (1996), or Nickell, Nicolitsas, and Dryden (1997). Alternatives to the price-cost margin
(economic rent) are measures of market concentration (concentration ratios, Herfindahl-Hirschman index, number of
firms), the elasticity of a firm’s profit with respect to its cost level (Boone, van Ours, and van der Wiel, 2007), and
the relative profit diﬀerence (Boone, 2008). Contrary to first-hand intuition, Sutton (2007) shows that, under general
assumptions, an increase in competition leads to higher concentration and a lower number of firms surviving in the
market. This is due to the reallocation eﬀect: If competition increases, more eﬃcient firms gain at the expense of
less eﬃcient firms (intensive margin), and less eﬃcient firms leave the market (extensive margin). Boone’s measures
correct for the reallocation eﬀect but require detailed firm-level data that are unavailable in a large cross-section.
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whereMarginict denotes a price-cost margin of industry i in country c in year t, and R&Dict denotes
total R&D expenditures. Function ϕ() stands for non-linear semi-parametric specifications, as my
model predicts a non-linear pattern. Marginict is an endogenous variable in the innovation equation
(1a). Vector SMP 0ic contains L instruments excluded from (1a). Industry, country, and year
dummies that control for industry-, country-, and annual-specific unobservable exogenous factors
in both equations are denoted as ηi, γc, and δt, respectively. The inclusion of dummy variables
transforms the data relative to industry-, country-, and annual means and the main coeﬃcient of
interest β1 is identified by comparing aﬀected (not aﬀected) industries in a subset of countries with
the same industries that are not aﬀected (are aﬀected) in the counterpart countries.
The empirical measures of competition and innovation used in (1a) have theoretical counter-
parts as follows. According to the model, the empirical measure of competition, Marginict, has
an expected value of 2λπ0 + (1− λ) (π1 + π−1) and is strictly decreasing in theoretical measure of
competition ∆ in both the unconstrained as well as financially constrained equilibrium. Similarly,
the empirical measure of innovation activity, R&Dict, has an expected value of 2λx+ (1− λ)y and
is strictly increasing in ∆ in the unconstrained equilibrium. Therefore, when there are no financial
constraints the model predicts that R&Dict decreases withMarginict; in other words, more intense
competition as measured by the price-cost margin leads to a higher innovation activity as measured
by R&D investment. In the financially constrained equilibrium, the empirical measure of innova-
tion, R&Dict, has an expected value of 2λxu+ (1− λ)yc in the relaxed competition region (strictly
increasing in ∆), while it has an expected value of 2λxc + (1 − λ)yu in the intense competition
region (strictly decreasing in ∆). Moreover, there is a wedge between the first-best and finan-
cially constrained empirical measure of innovation activity, R&Dict, when the empirical measure
of competition, Marginict, is both high (intense competition region) and low (relaxed competition
region).
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To test the main prediction of the model, I investigate the competition-innovation pattern across
countries with diﬀerent levels of financial development. As the quality of the financial system is
important in overcoming market frictions and securing outside financing for intangible and high-
risk projects (like R&D), financial development proxies the severity of financial constraints at the
country level. My main set of results comes from the parsimonious full-interaction specification
R&Dict = α1 +
X
j∈{H,L}
βj1 · ϕ (Marginict) · FDjc + ηi + γc + δt + ζict, (2)
which replaces equation (1a). Term
P
j∈{H,L} β
j
1 · ϕ (Marginict) · FDjc stands for the interac-
tion of the industry price-cost margin with the indicator variables equal to unity for countries with
above/below median values of financial development measure (FDHc and FD
L
c , respectively). In the
spirit of Rajan and Zingales (1998), the interaction term together with the country- and industry-
level fixed eﬀects helps to overcome the endogeneity between innovation and financial development.
The interaction term contains only that part of the variation in financial development that is un-
related to unobservable current and future growth opportunities which drive current innovation
activity at the country- and industry level. Regression (2) asks whether the above/below median
development of financial markets alters the way in which product market competition aﬀects inno-
vation activity conditional on all country-, industry-, and year-specific factors. The indicators of
financial development are measured as of the beginning of the EU’s ‘single market’.
I estimate the empirical model using the generalized method of moments (Hansen, 1982) and
instrumental variables estimators.27 The correlation of instruments with the price-cost margin is
examined by the fit of the first-stage regression (1b). I use Bound, Jaeger, and Baker (1995) statis-
27GMM estimators are more eﬃcient in the presence of heteroskedasticity and no worse asymptotically than IV
estimators if heteroskedasticity is not present (Baum, Schaﬀer, and Stillman, 2003). Also, while the consistency of the
IV coeﬃcient estimates is not aﬀected by the presence of heteroskedasticity, the classic IV estimates of the standard
errors are inconsistent and the usual forms of diagnostic tests for endogeneity and overidentifying restrictions are
invalid if heteroskedasticity is present. On the other hand, IV is preferable to GMM in small samples if the error is
homoskedastic. My results are very similar regardless of what estimation method I use, which is reassuring.
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tics: The R2 of the first-stage regression with the included instruments ‘partialled-out’ and the
F-test of the joint significance of excluded instruments. As I have multiple endogenous regressors
in specification (2) I also report the statistic proposed by Shea (1997): The ‘partial-R2’ measure
that takes the intercorrelation among instruments into account. Typically, I have more excluded
instruments than endogenous regressors (equations (1a) and (2) are overidentified), which allows
testing moment conditions.28 In the case of the GMM and heteroskedastic-robust IV estimator I
report the J statistic; in the case of the standard IV estimator I report Sargan’s statistic (Sargan,
1958). As Marginict and R&Dict are stable over time (annual factors explain almost no varia-
tion, see ANOVAs in Table A.6), the error terms in equations (1a), (1b), and (2) are likely to
exhibit some degree of autocorrelation. Therefore, my preferred estimator is a GMM estimator
with autocorrelation-consistent or heteroskedastic-and-autocorrelation-consistent standard errors.
3.2 Data
3.2.1 Industry-Level Variables
The industry-country-level variables: price-cost margin and R&D expenditures come from Eu-
rostat’s Structural Business Statistics database. This database is based on detailed data on all
enterprises and is available at NACE 3-digit level for the manufacturing sector of all EU countries.
For robustness, I use capital expenditures as an alternative to R&D in all specifications. Capital
expenditures are highly correlated with R&D and better covered across industries and countries.
Typically, capital expenditures regressions are based on more than twice as many observations com-
pared to analogous R&D specifications. See Table 1 for coverage and basic descriptive statistics
and Table DA.1 for the exact definition of the variables.
28Define vector Zict ≡ [SMP 0ic ηi γc δt] that contains all exogenous variables (excluded and included instruments).
Under the assumption E[Zict · ζict] = 0, excluded instruments give L moment conditions gict(bβ) = Z0ict · bζict =
Z 0ict · (R&Dict−Xict · bβ), where Xict ≡ [ϕ (Marginict) ηi γc δt] consists of both endogenous and exogenous regressors
in (1a). The case with equation (2) is analogous.
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3.2.2 EU ‘Single Market Programme’ Instrumental Variables
The list of country-sectors most aﬀected by the introduction of the EU’s ‘Single Market Programme’
(SMP) in 1993 (EU-wide product market reform) comes from Buigues, Ilzkovitz, and Lebrun (1990),
part of the Cecchini report.29 The list was composed mainly on the basis of the following structural
criteria: (i) The level of non-tariﬀ barriers (standards, frontier formalities, limited access to public
procurement, diﬀerences in VAT and excise duties, etc.), which measures the degree of protection
of the sectors; (ii) The dispersion of prices for identical products between EU member states, which
measures the level of fragmentation of the EU market; (iii) The rate of penetration by imports,
which measures the share of domestic demand accounted for by imports.
The indicators were constructed for 120 industrial sectors out of which 40 sectors were identified
as ones where non-tariﬀ barriers impede intra-EU trade. The selected 40 sectors represent about
50 percent of industrial value-added in the EU (ranges from 55 percent in Germany to 39 percent
in Spain). Finally, national experts were requested to verify the pertinence of the list of 40 sectors
relevant at the EU level for their own countries. Table 4 provides basic characteristics of the
industry-country pairs aﬀected by the reform while Table DA.1 lists the aﬀected industries and
follows Buigues, Ilzkovitz, and Lebrun (1990) in classifying them into six groups.
3.2.3 Financial Development Indicators
Data on financial development are drawn from the World Bank’s Financial Structure and Economic
Development Database (March 2005 version) described in detail in Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and
Levine (2000). To make my results comparable with those in the literature I use a number of
measures of finance activity to proxy financial development. I start with traditional measures of
activity in the credit and stock markets, namely the ratio of private credit to GDP and the ratio of
stock market capitalization and stock market total value traded to GDP. All proxies for financial
29These instruments were recently used by Griﬃth, Harrison, and Simpson (2006).
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development are averaged over the years 1990-1994, that is, as of the establishment of the ‘single
market’.30
In addition to volume-of-finance-activity measures of financial development, I also use a proxy
for the institutional quality of financial markets. Specifically, I follow Beck et al. (2004) and use
the indicator of the ‘quality of accounting standards’, produced by International Accounting and
Auditing Trends (Center for International Financial Analysis & Research, Inc.). This indicator
rates companies’ 1990 annual reports on the basis of their inclusion or omission of 90 items in the
balance sheets and income statements and ranges from 0 to 90.
All four indicators of financial development are summarized across the EU countries in Table
2. Despite the extensive integration of EU national product markets up to 1994, there is still
substantial diversity in the degree of financial development across the EU. The coeﬃcient of vari-
ation is particularly high for the measures of stock market activity. The middle panel of Table
2 presents correlations (with statistical significance levels) among diﬀerent measures of financial
development. The correlations suggest that these measures, although closely related, are never-
theless meaningfully diﬀerent. The bottom panel of Table 2 classifies EU countries into high/low
financial development groups based on above/below median values of each financial development
measure. Table 3 summarizes price-cost margin and R&D/capital expenditures in low-, medium-,
and high-competition-level industries separately for high/low financial development country groups.
3.3 Results
Table 5 reports estimates of equation (1a) with linear specification obtained using OLS, IV, and
GMM estimators. Regardless of the method used, there is a significant negative relationship between
price-cost margin and R&D/capital expenditures, which means a positive relationship between
competition and R&D/capital expenditures. The IV and GMM coeﬃcients are larger than the
30 I rely on time averages to avoid year-to-year fluctuations.
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ones obtained by OLS. Table 5 confirms the prediction of the model and is consistent with results
obtained by Griﬃth, Harrison, and Simpson (2006). Specifications (2) and (3) of Table 5 are
rejected using the Hansen J-test but the preferred ones, (4) and (5), are not. The instruments in
the first-stage regression are highly significant.31
Table 6 reports estimates of high/low financial development full-interaction specification (2) ob-
tained using the GMM estimator with autocorrelation-consistent and heteroskedastic-and-autocorrelation-
consistent standard errors. Table 6 also reports analogous estimates obtained using the GMM
estimator with standard errors clustered at the country-industry level. These results reveal that
the negative relationship between competition and R&D/capital expenditures comes mainly from
less financially developed countries, whereas there is no significant pattern in the high financially
developed country group.
Tables 7 and 8 report the results from the test of the main model’s prediction. The slope of
the competition-innovation pattern in less financially developed systems is steeper relative to the
benchmark observed in countries with highly developed financial systems for intense (Table 7) as
well as relaxed competition levels (Table 8). The estimates in Tables 7 and 8 are obtained using
analogous regressions to the ones in Table 6. The only diﬀerence is that in Table 7 I only interact
the bottom 25 percent of the price-cost margin variable (i.e., the industry-country cells with very
intense competition levels) with financial development. In line with the model, the coeﬃcients in
front of the interaction term between the price-cost margin and the low FD country group dummy
are positive and significant in all specifications, while it is never significant and sometimes negative
for the interaction term with the high FD country group dummy. In less financially developed
countries, within the most competitive industries an increase in competition leads to a reduction
in R&D/capital expenditures. In the most financially developed countries, there is no significant
eﬀect of competition on R&D/capital expenditures within the most competitive industries.
31See Table A.7 for the full first-stage regression results.
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Table 8 focuses on the upper 50 percent of the price-cost margin variable, i.e., the industry-
country cells with relaxed competition. In contrast to Table 7, the coeﬃcients in front of the
interaction term between the price-cost margin and the low FD country group dummy are negative
and significant in all specifications. The coeﬃcients in front of the interaction term with the high
FD country group dummy are typically negative, but only marginally significant. In less financially
developed countries, within the relaxed competition industries an increase in competition leads to
an increase in R&D/capital expenditures.
The results of Table 7 and 8 are depicted in Figure 3. The competition-innovation relationship
recovered empirically for high/low FD country groups closely mimics the theoretical competition-
innovation pattern of the unconstrained/financially constrained regime depicted in Figure 2.
In non-reported regressions, I tried diﬀerent threshold levels of the profit-cost margin variable
to define intense and relaxed competition regions. These alternative specifications led to results
analogous to those reported in Tables 7 and 8. To illustrate the robustness of results to threshold
definitions and to further explore the diﬀerence in the competition-innovation relationship between
high and low FD country groups, Figure 4 depicts fitted lines obtained from high/low financial
development full-interaction specifications analogous to the ones reported in the top panel of Table
6 but estimated separately on all quintiles of the price-cost margin variable.
3.4 Robustness checks
Tables A.1 and A.2 show robustness to autocorrelation and clustering. The estimates are fully
robust to autocorrelation but the estimates’ significance is lost when I cluster standard errors
at the industry-country level. This loss of significance is of minor concern, if one assumes that
industry-country-level variables (R&D/capital expenditures and price-cost margin) represent–in
each year–the equilibrium of the model developed in the first half of the paper.
Tables A.3, A.4, and A.5 report estimates of specifications in which instead of high/low finan-
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cial development country group full-interaction specifications I interact the price-cost margin with
continuous measures of financial development. For all practical purposes, the results are unchanged
and robust to this alternative type of interaction.
4 Conclusion
This paper examines how the R&D investment of financially constrained firms and endogenously
determined aggregate innovation activity depend on product market competition. The novel find-
ings come from an analysis of the interaction between competition and lack of external finance. The
presence of financial constraints aﬀects innovation through two channels: The constraints set an
upper bound on firms’ R&D investments, and they also change their incentives to innovate–firms
change their R&D strategies depending on whether their competitors are financially constrained
or not. This demonstrates the importance of analyzing the impact of financial frictions on firms’
individual decisions in a model of market interaction.
I show that if firms finance R&D activities only out of current profits, they underinvest the
most in industries with intense and very relaxed competition. On the aggregate level, the presence
of financial constraints results in a stronger inverted-U competition-innovation pattern than when
firms have frictionless access to external finance. The key to these results is the assumption that,
in order to innovate, firms need to invest cash in R&D and that competition aﬀects the amount
they can invest. The paper models this idea in a very tractable way.
In the empirical part I find that the interaction between competition and financial development is
an important determinant of the shape of the aggregate competition-innovation relationship, which
is consistent with the presented theory. Relative to the competition-innovation pattern in the most
financially developed countries, the competition-innovation relationship has an inverted-U shape in
less financially developed systems. This finding is established when I identify the causal impact of
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competition on innovation by exploiting a major EU product market reform, the introduction of the
‘single market’, and is robust to a number of alternative specifications. The empirical analysis helps
to explain why the shape of the competition-innovation pattern has not been fully resolved to date;
it may be that many papers in this area do not control for the presence of financial constraints, an
important determinant of this relationship.
This paper contributes to policy discussions by stressing the importance of external finance
supply for innovation success. The theoretical argument and empirical analysis developed in this
paper suggest that innovation-enhancing policies implemented through competition reforms ought
to be complemented by promoting financial development.
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Appendix A
Figure 1: The top (middle) two graphs depict the R&D investment of each firm in the neck-
and-neck state (of the laggard) as a function of competition, while the bottom two graphs show the
aggregate innovation intensity. The blue (dark) solid lines are the R&D investments from Propo-
sition 1 depicted for competition levels at which the financial constraints do not bind. The blue
dashed lines depict the same quantities ignoring financial constraints. The red (light) solid lines
depict profit π0 (π−1) each firm in the neck-and-neck state (the laggard) gets for competition levels
at which the financial constraints are binding. In the top (middle) graphs, red lines connect to
blue ones at threshold competition levels ∆ (∆); in the bottom graphs the dashed lines switch to
solid ones at ∆ and back to dashed ones at ∆ (see Proposition 2). Parameters: Left: π1 = 0.94,
π−1 = 0.08, h = 0.30, r = 0.02; Right: π1 = 0.73, π−1 = 0.14, h = 0.00, r = 0.02.
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Figure 2: The top (bottom) graph on the right depicts the firm’s R&D investments in the neck-and-
neck (the laggard’s R&D investment in the unleveled) state as a function of competition: (i) The
blue (dark) solid lines are the firm’s R&D investments from Proposition 1 depicted for intermediate
competition levels at which the unconstrained equilibrium exists, ∆ ∈ (∆,∆); (ii) The blue dashed
lines depict the same quantities if financial constraints are ignored in the relaxed competition re-
gion, ∆ ∈
£
1
2 ,∆
¤
, and the intense competition region, ∆ ∈ [∆, 1]; (iii) The red (light) solid lines are
the firm’s R&D investments from Proposition 3 if financial constraints are binding. The top left
graph shows the corresponding aggregate innovation intensities, while the bottom left graph shows
the fraction of industries in the neck-and-neck state. Parameters: π1 = 0.95, π−1 = 0.09, h = 0.25,
r = 0.02.
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Figure 3: The Figure depicts fitted lines obtained from high/low financial development full-interaction
specifications based on 0 to 25 percent of the profit-cost margin variable from Table 7 columns (2)
and (6), and similar specifications based on 50 to 100 percent of the profit-cost margin variable from
Table 8 columns (2) and (6). The dependent variable in the top two graphs is R&D expenditures
while the dependent variable in the bottom two graphs is capital expenditures. Red (light) line:
Fitted regression line based on the coeﬃcient in front of the low financial development country
group interaction variable; Blue (dark) line: Fitted regression line based on the coeﬃcient in front
of the high financial development country group interaction variable. Thick (thin) line denotes
significance (no significance) at the 5% level.
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Figure 4: The Figure depicts fitted lines obtained from high/low financial development full-interaction
specifications analogous to the ones reported in the top panel of Table 6 but estimated separately on
all quintiles of the profit-cost margin variable. The dependent variable is R&D expenditures in all
graphs. Red (light) line: Fitted regression line based on the coeﬃcient in front of the low financial
development country group interaction variable; Blue (dark) line: Fitted regression line based on
the coeﬃcient in front of the high financial development country group interaction variable. Thick
(thin) line denotes significance (no significance) at the 5% level.
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Appendix B
Table 1: EU ‘single-market’ Industry-Country-Year Data in 1995-2004
Table 2: Financial Development: EU ‘single-market’ Countries in 1990-1994
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics by Competition and Financial Development
Table 4: EU ‘Single Market Programme’ (SMP): Industry-Country Pairs Aﬀected by the Reform
Table 5: R&D / Capital Expenditures and Competition
Table 6: Competition: Financial Development (FD) Full Interaction Specification
Table 7: ‘Intense’ Competition: Financial Development (FD) Full Interaction Specification
Table 8: ‘Relaxed’ Competition: Financial Development (FD) Full Interaction Specification
Table A.1: ‘Intense’ Competition: Robustness to Autocorrelation and Clustering
Table A.2: ‘Relaxed’ Competition: Robustness to Autocorrelation and Clustering
Table A.3: R&D / Capital Expenditures and Competition: Financial Development (FD) Contin-
uous Interaction
Table A.4: ‘Intense’ Competition: Financial Development (FD) Continuous Interaction Specifica-
tion
Table A.5: ‘Relaxed’ Competition: Financial Development (FD) Continuous Interaction Specifi-
cation
Table A.6: ANOVAs: EU ‘single-market’ Countries in 1995-2004
Table A.7: First-Stage: Competition and the EU ‘Single Market Programme’ (SMP) Instruments
Table DA.1: Definition of Variables
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Appendix C
Proof of Proposition 1
Consider the value functions of the leader, of each firm in the neck-and-neck state, and of the laggard
when their rival’s strategy is characterized by the R&D investment pair {x, y} in the two states.
Let V1, V0, and V−1 denote the steady state values of being currently the leader in the unleveled
state, a firm in the neck-and-neck state, and the laggard in the unleveled state, respectively. V0 is
obtained from the optimization problem
V0 = max
x
n
(π0 − x) dt+ e−rdt
h√
xV1dt+
√
xV−1dt+
h
1−
³√
x+
√
x
´
dt
i
V0
io
.
V1 and V−1 are determined analogously. For dt small, e−rdt ≈ 1− rdt, the terms of order (dt)2 can
be ignored, and the system of equations becomes
rV0 = max
x
n
(π0 − x) +
√
x (V1 − V0)−
√
x (V0 − V−1)
o
,
rV−1 = max
y
{(π−1 − y) + (√y + h) (V0 − V−1)} , (3)
rV1 = π1 −
³p
y + h
´
(V1 − V0) .
The first line of (3), which describes the optimization problem of each firm in the neck-and-neck
state, reads as follows. The annuity value of being a firm in the neck-and-neck state at date t, rV0,
equals current profit flow minus R&D investment flow, π0 − x, plus capital gain, V1 − V0, in case
the firm innovates and becomes the leader (which happens with intensity
√
x), minus capital loss,
V0−V−1, in case the firm’s competitor innovates and the firm becomes the laggard (which happens
with intensity
√
x). In the second line of (3), the annuity value of being the laggard at date t,
rV−1, equals current profit flow minus R&D investment flow, π−1 − y, plus the expected capital
gain
¡√
y + h
¢
(V0 − V−1) in case the laggard innovates and catches up with the leader. Finally,
the annuity value of being the leader at date t, rV1, equals current profit flow π1 minus expected
capital loss (
√
y + h) (V1 − V0) in case the laggard innovates and the industry switches to the neck-
and-neck state. The first order conditions are V1 = 2
√
x+ V0 and V−1 = −2
√
y + V0 for a firm in
the neck-and-neck state and the laggard, respectively. System of equations (3) together with FOCs
and symmetry (x = x, y = y) leads to
π0 = rV0 + 2
√
x
√
y − x,
π1 = rV0 + 2
√
x (h+ r +
√
y) , (4)
π−1 = rV0 − 2(h+ r)
√
y − y.
Solving (4) when π0 ≡ π−1+(1−∆)(π1−π−1) and simplifying using Π ≡ π1−π−1 and H ≡ h+ r
gives ⎧
⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
x = Π∆+ 2H
³
H −
√
H2 +Π∆
´
,
y = 4H2 + (1 + 2∆)Π− 2H
√
H2 +Π∆−
2
r
(H2 +Π∆)
³
3H2 + (1 +∆)Π− 2H
√
H2 +Π∆
´
⎫
⎪⎪⎬
⎪⎪⎭
. (5)
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Further simplification yields the results presented in Proposition 1. Solution (5) is the only one
with x ≥ 0 and y ≥ 0 for Π > 0 and H ≥ 0 (within the class of symmetric stationary Markov
equilibria). In the special case when r = 0 and h = 0 result (5) simplifies ton
x = Π∆, y = Π
h
1 + 2
³
∆−
p
∆(1 +∆)
´io
. (6)
Proof of Corollary 1
Comparative static results obtained by diﬀerentiating the R&D investment of a firm in the neck-
and-neck state (part one of Proposition 1) and simplifying using Π ≡ π1 − π−1, H ≡ h + r, and
Ω ≡
√
H2 +∆Π > H are
∂x
∂∆
= Π
µ
1− H
Ω
¶
> 0,
∂x
∂Π
= ∆
µ
1− H
Ω
¶
> 0, and
∂x
∂H
= −2 (Ω−H)
2
Ω
< 0.
Similarly, comparative static properties of the laggard’s R&D investment in the unleveled state
(part two of Proposition 1) are
∂y
∂∆
= Π
µ
2− H
Ω
− 2H
2 +Π− 3HΩ+ 2Ω2
Ω
√
2H2 +Π− 2HΩ+Ω2
¶
< 0,
∂y
∂Π
= 1 + 2∆− ∆H
Ω
− (1 + 4∆)H
2 + 2∆(1 +∆)Π− 3∆HΩ
Ω
√
2H2 +Π− 2HΩ+Ω2
> 0, and
∂y
∂H
= 8H − 2H
2
Ω
− 2Ω+
2
¡
3H4 + 5∆H2Π+Ω4 −HΩ
¡
2H2 +Π+ 4Ω2
¢¢
Ω
√
2H2 +Π− 2HΩ+Ω2
< 0.
As 0 < x < Π and 0 < y < Π, if the technological leadership rent satisfies Π ≤ 1 so that 0 <
√
x < 1
and 0 <
√
y < 1, innovation intensities
√
x and
√
y are well-defined probabilities.
Proof of Corollary 2
In the steady state, the flow of industries from the neck-and-neck state to the unleveled state
matches the opposite flow
2λ
√
x = (1− λ) (√y + h) . (7)
Solving (7) for λ gives the steady state fraction of industries in the neck-and-neck state
λ =
√
y + h
2
√
x+
√
y + h
. (8)
Substituting (7) and (8) into the definition of the aggregate innovation intensity I ≡ 2λ
√
x+ (1−
λ)
¡√
y + h
¢
and simplifying gives
I =
4
√
x
¡√
y + h
¢
2
√
x+
√
y + h
, (9)
where x and y are the R&D investments from Proposition 1. Diﬀerentiating (9) with respect to Π,
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r, ∆, and h and applying the comparative static results derived in Corollary 1 gives
∂I
∂Π
=
2
¡√
y + h
¢2√
y ∂x∂Π + 4x
3
2
∂y
∂Π√
x
¡
2
√
x+
√
y + h
¢2√
y
> 0, (10)
∂I
∂r
=
2
¡√
y + h
¢2√
y ∂x∂r + 4x
3
2
∂y
∂r√
x
¡
2
√
x+
√
y + h
¢2√
y
< 0, (11)
∂I
∂∆
=
2
¡√
y + h
¢2√
y ∂x∂∆ + 4x
3
2
∂y
∂∆√
x
¡
2
√
x+
√
y + h
¢2√
y
>
<
0, and (12)
∂I
∂h
=
2
h¡√
y + h
¢2√
y ∂x∂h + 2x
3
2
³
2
√
y + ∂y∂h
´i
√
x
¡
2
√
x+
√
y + h
¢2√
y
>
<
0. (13)
Substituting the R&D investments from Proposition 1 into (9) and applying restrictions r = 0,
h = 0 gives
I =
√
Π
4
√
∆
q
1 + 2∆− 2
p
∆(1 +∆)
2
√
∆+
q
1 + 2∆− 2
p
∆(1 +∆)
. (14)
Diﬀerentiating (14) with respect to ∆ and solving equation ∂I∂∆ = 0 reveals that
∂I
∂∆ > 0 for ∆ <
1
3
while ∂I∂∆ < 0 for ∆ >
1
3 . This proves statement two in Corollary 2.
Analyzing (12) when r > 0 and h > 0 reveals that there exist 0 < h− < h+ < 1 such that
when h ∈ (h−, h+): ∂I∂∆ > 0 for ∆ ∈
£
1
2 ,∆peak
¢
and ∂I∂∆ < 0 for ∆ ∈ (∆peak, 1]. Condition
∂I
∂∆ = 0
determines ∆peak as a solution to the implicit equation 4x
3
( ∂x∂∆)
2 =
(
√
y+h)
4
y
( ∂y∂∆)
2 . Analyzing (13) when
r > 0 and h > 0 reveals that there exist 0 < hpeak < 1 such that ∂I∂h > 0 for h ∈ [0, hpeak) and
∂I
∂h < 0 for ∆ ∈ (hpeak, 1]. Condition
∂I
∂h = 0 determines hpeak as a solution to the implicit equation
4x3
( ∂x∂h)
2 =
(
√
y+h)
4
( ∂x∂h−2
√
y)
2
yh
( ∂y∂h)
2−4y
i2 .
Examples of peaks of the two inverted-Us: For π1 = 0.9, π−1 = 0.2, r = 0.03, h = 0.15, solution
to equation ∂I∂∆ = 0 is at ∆ = 0.554, the equilibrium R&D investment of a firm in the neck-and-neck
state is x = 0.219 < π0 = 0.512, the equilibrium R&D investment of the laggard in the unleveled
state is y = 0.107 < π−1, and the aggregate innovation intensity is I = 0.632. For π1 = 0.9,
π−1 = 0.2, r = 0.03, ∆ = 0.6, solution to equation ∂I∂h = 0 is at h = 0.399, the equilibrium R&D
investment of a firm in the neck-and-neck state is x = 0.188 < π0 = 0.340, the equilibrium R&D
investment of the laggard in the unleveled state is y = 0.030 < π−1, and the aggregate innovation
intensity is I = 0.689.
Proof of Proposition 2
Part one is obtained by solving the system of inequalities½
x > π−1 + (1−∆) (π1 − π−1) , π1 > π−1 > 0,
1
2
≤ ∆ ≤ 1, H > 0
¾
,
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where H ≡ h + r and x is from Proposition 1 for parameters {π1, π−1,∆,H}. The threshold
competition intensity of a firm in the neck-and-neck state, ∆, presented in part one of Proposition
2 solves x = π0 for ∆. Similarly, part two of Proposition 2 is obtained by solving the system of
inequalities ½
y > π−1, π1 > π−1 > 0,
1
2
≤ ∆ ≤ 1
¾
for parameters {π1, π−1,∆}
under a simplifying restriction H = 0. The laggard’s threshold competition intensity, ∆, presented
in part two of Proposition 2 solves y = π−1 for ∆ when H > 0.
Solving the system of inequalities©
∆ < 1, π1 > π−1 > 0, H > 0
ª
for parameters {π1, π−1,H}
gives
∆ < 1⇐⇒
µ
π−1 <
π1
2
and H <
Π− π−1
2
√
π−1
¶
.
Similarly, solving the system of inequalities½
1
2
< ∆, π1 > π−1 > 0, H > 0
¾
for parameters {π1, π−1,H}
gives
1
2
< ∆⇐⇒
Ã
π−1 <
3−
√
3
6
π1 and H < HIGH(π1, π−1)
!
orÃ
3 +
√
3
6
π1 < π−1 and H < H(π1, π−1)
!
,
where
HIGH(π1, π−1) ≡
r
π21−26π1π−1+41π2−1
π−1
+
3
√
SUB2HIGH+π
4
1−4π31π−1+38π21π2−1−20π1π3−1+49π4−1
π−1 3
√
SUBHIGH
4
√
3
and
SUBHIGH ≡ π61 − 6π51π−1 + 63π41π2−1 − 140π31π3−1 + 567π21π4−1 + 210π1π5−1 − 343π6−1 +
+48
√
6π1
q
π7−1
¡
π31 − 5π21π−1 + 43π1π2−1 − 49π3−1
¢
.
Threshold function H(π1, π−1) is available upon request. Solving the system of inequalities©
∆ < ∆, π1 > π−1 > 0, H > 0
ª
for parameters {π1, π−1,H}
gives
∆ < ∆⇔
Ã
π−1 <
3−
√
5
4
π1 and LOW (π1, π−1) < H
!
or
Ã
3−
√
5
4
π1 ≤ π−1
!
,
40
where
LOW (π1, π−1) ≡
s
π−1
µ
1 +
π21
3
√
6 3
√
SUBLOW
¶
− π1 +
3
√
SUBLOW
2π−1
3
√
62
and
SUBLOW ≡ 9π41π2−1 +
q
81π81π
4
−1 − 48π61π6−1.
By combining the conditions for 12 < ∆, ∆ < 1, and ∆ < ∆ I obtain the necessary and suﬃcient
condition for the existence of three competition regions: (i) The relaxed competition region, ∆ ∈£
1
2 ,∆
¤
, in which the laggard is financially constrained; (ii) The intermediate competition region,
∆ ∈ (∆,∆), in which the unconstrained equilibrium of Proposition 1 exists; (iii) The intense
competition region, ∆ ∈ [∆, 1], in which the firms in the neck-and-neck state are constrained, i.e.,
1
2 < ∆ < ∆ < 1; as followsÃ
π−1 <
3−
√
5
4
π1 and LOW (π1, π−1) < h+ r < HIGH(π1, π−1)
!
orÃ
3−
√
5
4
π1 ≤ π−1 <
3−
√
3
6
π1 and h+ r < HIGH(π1, π−1)
!
.
By diﬀerentiating, the threshold competition intensity of a firm in the neck-and-neck state, ∆,
satisfies
∂∆
∂π1
=
H2 − π−1 −
H(H2+π−1+π1)√
H2+2π1
2Π2
< 0,
∂∆
∂π−1
=
π1 +
¡√
H2 + 2π1 −H
¢
H
2Π2
> 0, and
∂∆
∂H
=
1
Π
µ
H2 + π1√
H2 + 2π1
−H
¶
> 0.
Similarly, the laggard’s threshold competition intensity, ∆, satisfies
∂∆
∂π1
=
8H2
√
π−1
¡
H +
√
π−1
¢
+ (Π− π−1)π1
4
¡
H +
√
π−1
¢2Π2 > 0⇐⇒
⇐⇒
³
π−1 ≤
π1
2
´
or
³π1
2
< π−1 and H1(π1, π−1) < H
´
,
∂∆
∂π−1
= π21
π−1 −Π− 4H2 − 3H
√
π−1
4
¡
H +
√
π−1
¢3Π2√π−1 −H
Ã√
π−1
Π2
+
(H2 − 2π−1)π1¡
H +
√
π−1
¢2Π2√π−1
!
< 0⇐⇒
⇐⇒
³
π−1 ≤
π1
2
´
or
³π1
2
< π−1 < dπ−1(π1) and H2(π1, π−1) < H´ or
(dπ−1(π1) ≤ π−1 and H3(π1, π−1) < H) , and
∂∆
∂H
=
4
¡
H +
√
π−1
¢√
π−1
h
π1 −
¡
H +
√
π−1
¢2i− π21
2
¡
H +
√
π−1
¢3Π < 0.
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Threshold functions H1(π1, π−1), H2(π1, π−1), H3(π1, π−1), and dπ−1(π1) are available upon re-
quest.
Proof of Proposition 3
Assume that the laggard invests π−1 in the relaxed competition region ∆ ∈
£
1
2 ,∆
¤
. The system of
equations (3) together with the FOC for a firm in the neck-and-neck state, V1 = 2
√
xu + V0, the
restriction on laggard’s R&D investment yc = π−1, and symmetry (xu = xu, yc = yc) leads to
π0 = rV0 +
√
xu (V0 − V−1)− xu,
π1 = rV0 + 2
√
xu (h+ r +
√
π−1) , (15)
rV−1 = (h+
√
π−1) (V0 − V−1).
Solving (15) when π0 ≡ π−1+(1−∆)(π1−π−1) and simplifying using Π ≡ π1−π−1 and H ≡ h+r
gives
xu =
(3∆− 2)Π+ 2
¡
H + 2
√
π−1
¢
H − SUBxu
9
+
(SUBxu + π1)π1
18
¡
H +
√
π−1
¢2 , where (16)
SUBxu ≡
r
π21 + 4(H +
√
π−1)
2
h
(H +
√
π−1)
2 + 3∆Π− π1
i
.
Assume that a firm in the neck-and-neck state invests π0 in the intense competition region
∆ ∈ [∆, 1]. The system of equations (3) together with the FOC for the laggard, V−1 = −2
√
yu+V0,
the restriction on R&D investment of a firm in the neck-and-neck state xc = π0, and symmetry
(xc = xc, yu = yu) leads to
rV0 =
√
π0 (V1 − V0)− 2
√
π0
√
yu,
π1 = rV1 + (h+
√
yu) (V1 − V0) , (17)
π−1 = rV0 − 2
√
yu (h+ r)− yu.
Eliminating V0 and V1 from (17), applying π0 ≡ π−1 + (1 −∆)(π1 − π−1) and simplifying using
Π ≡ π1 − π−1 and H ≡ h+ r gives equation
yu + 2H
√
yu + π−1 =
£
π1 − 2
¡
yu +H
√
yu
¢¤√
π1 −∆Π
√
yu +H +
√
π1 −∆Π
, (18)
which defines yu implicitly. Explicit solution of (18), though complicated, exists and is available
upon request.
Proof of Corollary 3
The substitution of the threshold competition intensity ∆ from Proposition 2 into xu (Proposition
3) and into x (Proposition 1) verifies that xu = x =
µ
π1
2(H+√π−1)
−√π−1
¶2
at ∆ = ∆. This result
together with the fact that xu is continuous,
∂xu
∂∆
=
Π
3
⎛
⎜⎜⎝1 +
π1 − 2
¡
H +
√
π−1
¢2r
π21 + 4
¡
H +
√
π−1
¢2 h¡
H +
√
π−1
¢2
+ 3∆Π− π1
i
⎞
⎟⎟⎠ > 0, and
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xu > x when ∆ = 12 establishes that xu > x for all ∆ ∈
£
1
2 ,∆
¢
.
The substitution of the threshold competition intensity ∆ from Proposition 2 into yu (Proposi-
tion 3) and into y (Proposition 1) verifies that
yu = y =
1
4
⎡
⎣√2SUB∆ − 2
s
H2 +Π+
µ
H −
SUB∆√
2
¶2⎤
⎦
2
at ∆ = ∆, where SUB∆ ≡
q
π1 +H
¡
H +
√
H2 + 2π1
¢
. Fact that yu > y for all ∆ ∈ (∆, 1] is
established using numerical simulations. These simulations are available upon request.
Proof of Corollary 4
In the steady state, the flow of industries from the neck-and-neck state to the unleveled state matches
the opposite flow 2λ
√
xu = (1 − λ)
¡√
yc + h
¢
. Solving for λ and substituting into the definition
of the aggregate innovation intensity I ≡ 2λ√xu + (1− λ)
¡√
yc + h
¢
gives I{xu,yc} =
4
√
xu(
√
yc+h)
2
√
xu+
√
yc+h
,
where xu and yc are the R&D investments from Proposition 3. The aggregate innovation intensity
I{xc,yu} is derived analogously.
Corollary 3 says that xu = x and yc = y at ∆ = ∆. Therefore, it must be that I{xu,yc} = I at
∆ = ∆. Similarly, as xc = x and yu = y at ∆ = ∆, it must be that I{xc,yu} = I at ∆ = ∆. Facts
that I{xu,yc} < I for ∆ ∈
£
1
2 ,∆
¢
and I{xc,yu} < I for ∆ ∈
¡
∆, 1
¤
are established using numerical
simulations. These simulations are available upon request.
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Mean Median S.D. N Mean Median S.D. N Mean Median S.D.
Austria 0.143 0.129 0.076 902 0.044 0.021 0.067 912 0.315 0.309 0.119 No
Belgium 0.162 0.142 0.089 547 0.027 0.005 0.063 652 0.337 0.332 0.114 Yes
Denmark 0.160 0.141 0.083 775 - - - 0 0.297 0.294 0.100 Yes
Finland 0.142 0.123 0.088 889 - - - 0 0.352 0.343 0.115 No
France 0.139 0.121 0.070 859 0.051 0.017 0.097 740 0.249 0.236 0.113 Yes
Germany 0.118 0.106 0.058 559 0.052 0.019 0.076 587 0.249 0.247 0.100 Yes
Ireland 0.141 0.122 0.089 607 - - - 0 0.399 0.402 0.145 Yes
Italy 0.180 0.161 0.083 981 0.022 0.004 0.056 277 0.414 0.422 0.103 Yes
Netherlands 0.126 0.109 0.070 836 - - - 0 0.358 0.349 0.111 Yes
Portugal 0.239 0.226 0.109 509 0.001 0.000 0.005 534 0.366 0.364 0.131 Yes
Spain 0.134 0.116 0.077 974 0.027 0.012 0.047 168 0.359 0.351 0.109 Yes
Sweden 0.148 0.131 0.077 880 0.050 0.010 0.093 259 0.287 0.278 0.127 No
UK 0.122 0.107 0.066 836 0.035 0.009 0.084 593 0.390 0.386 0.122 Yes
15 - Food products and beverages 0.203 0.184 0.089 720 0.007 0.004 0.008 340 0.427 0.422 0.105 -
17 - Textiles 0.143 0.127 0.080 544 0.009 0.005 0.010 259 0.297 0.300 0.092 -
18 - Apparel 0.099 0.080 0.070 205 0.001 0.000 0.002 96 0.335 0.319 0.138 -
19 - Leather 0.093 0.083 0.047 204 0.004 0.003 0.006 89 0.314 0.307 0.099 -
20 - Wood, products of wood and cork 0.176 0.160 0.089 419 0.002 0.001 0.002 167 0.347 0.326 0.109 -
21 - Pulp, paper and paper products 0.198 0.180 0.088 169 0.006 0.005 0.004 75 0.418 0.419 0.100 -
22 - Printing and publishing 0.149 0.129 0.091 236 0.001 0.001 0.002 112 0.371 0.366 0.116 -
23 - Coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel 0.214 0.203 0.124 46 0.021 0.007 0.029 32 0.558 0.584 0.133 -
24 - Chemicals 0.161 0.138 0.084 509 0.067 0.050 0.076 250 0.412 0.422 0.116 -
25 - Rubber and plastics 0.161 0.155 0.063 170 0.030 0.014 0.041 78 0.337 0.339 0.088 -
26 - Other non-metallic mineral products 0.173 0.158 0.088 597 0.008 0.004 0.010 281 0.391 0.386 0.132 -
27 - Basic metals 0.175 0.161 0.080 351 0.014 0.007 0.016 179 0.333 0.323 0.122 -
28 - Fabricated metal products 0.131 0.117 0.066 554 0.008 0.004 0.010 262 0.301 0.305 0.099 -
29 - Machinery and equipment 0.111 0.100 0.050 549 0.073 0.037 0.143 268 0.293 0.298 0.102 -
31 - Electrical machinery 0.126 0.115 0.066 469 0.050 0.037 0.049 218 0.300 0.307 0.123 -
32 - Radio, television and communication equipment 0.165 0.141 0.100 211 0.194 0.172 0.161 112 0.302 0.301 0.149 -
33 - Medical, precision and optical instruments 0.096 0.086 0.053 387 0.067 0.048 0.074 188 0.323 0.314 0.131 -
34 - Motor vehicles 0.173 0.159 0.096 237 0.062 0.019 0.079 117 0.302 0.291 0.128 -
35 - Other transport equipment 0.117 0.104 0.062 325 0.060 0.020 0.087 153 0.252 0.261 0.131 -
36 - Manufacturing N.E.C. 0.121 0.109 0.067 445 0.019 0.005 0.049 213 0.348 0.335 0.106 -
37 - Recycling 0.248 0.242 0.101 136 0.001 0.000 0.002 62 0.468 0.496 0.119 -
Note: The number of observations, N, corresponds to industry-country-year observations with non-missing values of „CapEx‟ and „Margin‟ („R&D‟ and „Margin‟) across 101 three-digit
NACE manufacturing industries in 13 EU countries over the period 1995-2004. „CapEx‟ is defined as gross investments in tangible goods divided by value-added. „R&D‟ is defined as
total intra-mural R&D expenditure divided by value-added. „Margin‟ is defined as operating profit and is scaled by value-added. „EU-SMP 1993‟ indicates which countries participated in
the EU „Single Market Programme‟ at its inception in 1993. Austria, Finland, and Sweden joined the EU in 1995. The statistics in the bottom panel are based on the „EU-SMP 1993‟
countries only—my main sample. Before computing the statistics (Mean, Median, and Standard Deviation), I remove outliers by using the 1-to-99 percentile range of the variables. See
the Data Appendix for complete definitions and sources of variables.
EU ‘single-market’ Industry-Country-Year Data in 1995-2004
Table 1
by Country
by NACE 2-digit Industry
Margin EU-SMP           
1993
CapEx R&D
Mean
Median
S.D. / Mean
Min
Max
Min Country
Max Country
N
Private Credit
Market Capitalization
Market Value Traded
Accounting Standards
Austria
Belgium
Denmark
Finland
France
Germany
Ireland
Italy
Netherlands
Portugal
Spain
Sweden
UK
Low
Low
Low
Low
Low
Low
Low
Low
Low
High
Low
Low High
Low
High/Low Financial Development Country Groups
Basic Statistics
0.48 0.66* 0.65* 1.00
Low
Correlations
9
1.00
UKUK
780.450.971.41
360.04
High
High
Low
High
Low
Low
Low
High
High
High
High
High
High
Low
High High
High
Low
High
High Low
Low
Low
High
Low
High
High
High
Low
High
Low
High
Low
High
Low
High -
Financial Development: EU ‘single-market’ Countries in 1990-1994
Market 
Capitalization
0.12 62
10
Belgium Belgium
0.66** 0.89*** 1.00
Private                    
Credit
0.130.42
0.39
0.58*
Table 2
0.83 0.18
0.72 0.27
Note: The top panel: I first compute the country average of each financial development measure in the
period 1990-1994 (the exception is Accounting Standards, which corresponds to 1990). Second, I
present the Mean, Median, Coefficient of Variation, Min, and Max of the country averages from the
first step across 10 EU countries that participated in the EU „Single Market Programme‟ at its
inception in 1993 (see Table 1). The bottom panel classifies countries into a high or low financial
development group based on above/below median levels of the respective financial development
measure. The financial development measures and high/low indicators are used as explanatory
variables in regressions. See the Data Appendix for complete definitions and sources of variables.
0.79 0.34 0.15 62
Accounting 
Standards
Market Value 
Traded
1.00
0.73
1010
Belgium
Netherlands UK
Denmark
High Low High Low High Low
Margin 0.189 0.227 0.319 0.363 0.471 0.500
CapEx 0.096 0.128 0.111 0.154 0.140 0.176
R&D 0.022 0.003 0.014 0.002 0.008 0.000
N - CapEx 999 824 2,046 1,717 1,019 878
N - R&D 756 362 933 764 399 337
High Low High Low High Low
Margin 0.194 0.224 0.315 0.367 0.471 0.503
CapEx 0.107 0.105 0.125 0.144 0.135 0.176
R&D 0.015 0.015 0.011 0.002 0.005 0.000
N - CapEx 945 913 1,945 1,821 963 896
N - R&D 603 580 907 708 475 278
High Low High Low High Low
Margin 0.182 0.231 0.320 0.354 0.489 0.486
CapEx 0.097 0.118 0.114 0.147 0.127 0.193
R&D 0.022 0.003 0.014 0.002 0.008 0.001
N - CapEx 913 909 1,858 1,922 926 955
N - R&D 701 390 916 802 303 439
High Low High Low High Low
Margin 0.202 0.235 0.332 0.337 0.485 0.479
CapEx 0.097 0.117 0.112 0.152 0.140 0.193
R&D 0.017 0.015 0.014 0.003 0.008 0.001
N - CapEx 862 1,443 1,766 1,688 877 847
N - R&D 550 597 626 987 325 466
Market Capitalization
Market Value Traded
Note: The Table reports Median of „Margin‟, „CapEx‟, and „R&D‟ across 10 EU countries that participated
in the EU „Single Market Programme‟ at its inception in 1993 (see Table 1). Medians are reported
individually for industries characterized by „Intense Competition‟ (defined as the first quartile of „Margin‟
variable), „Medium Competition‟ (defined as the second together with the third quartile of „Margin‟
variable), and „Relaxed Competition‟ (defined as the fourth quartile of „Margin‟ variable) separately for
high/low financial development country groups (see Table 2). „N - CapEx‟ is the number of industry-country-
year observations with non-missing values of „CapEx‟ and „Margin‟; „N - R&D‟ is the number of industry-
country-year observations with non-missing values of „R&D‟ and „Margin‟. See the Data Appendix for
complete definitions and sources of variables.
Table 3
Descriptive Statistics by Competition and Financial Development
Accounting Standards
Intense Competition                       
Margin < 25pct
Relaxed Competition                       
Margin > 75pct
Medium Competition                 
25pct < Margin < 75pct
Private Credit
N Empl N Empl N Empl N Empl N Empl N Empl
Belgium 2 4.0 6 0.9 8 1.6 9 1.3 7 1.1 21 1.4
Denmark 2 4.8 6 0.7 8 1.6 7 2.5 6 2.5 12 1.0
France 2 2.4 6 1.7 8 2.4 9 3.5 9 1.4 21 1.6
Germany 2 6.1 6 1.0 7 5.6 9 1.2 9 1.2 17 1.6
Ireland 2 2.6 6 0.6 8 1.2 9 1.1 9 0.6 21 1.0
Italy 2 1.9 6 0.6 8 1.0 9 1.7 9 1.1 21 1.8
Netherlands 2 7.3 5 0.5 8 1.1 9 1.3 9 1.4 17 0.7
Portugal 1 0.1 6 0.7 8 0.8 9 2.1 6 0.4 21 2.3
Spain 2 1.3 6 0.7 8 1.4 9 0.9 9 0.7 21 1.3
UK 2 2.9 3 1.1 8 1.0 9 2.3 7 1.6 21 1.2
15 - Food products and beverages 1 1.0 3 2.6 1 1.1
17 - Textiles 4 5.5
18 - Apparel 2 8.2
19 - Leather 1 1.5
22 - Printing and publishing 2 3.0
24 - Chemicals 1 1.7 4 3.4
25 - Rubber and plastics 1 4.1 1 1.2
26 - Other non-metallic mineral products 4 3.6
28 - Fabricated metal products 2 1.4 1 0.7
29 - Machinery and equipment 1 1.0 6 6.3
31 - Electrical machinery 4 5.3 1 1.0
32 - Radio, television and communication equipment 1 2.8 1 3.5 1 1.5
33 - Medical, precision and optical instruments 1 2.8 1 2.8
34 - Motor vehicles 1 0.7 1 5.0
35 - Other transport equipment 1 0.4 2 2.4
36 - Manufacturing N.E.C. 1 0.3 3 6.5
37 - Recycling 1 1.2
by NACE 2-digit Industry
by Country
Note: The Table lists the number (columns „N‟) of NACE 3-digit industries identified (ex ante) to be affected by introduction of the „Single Market
Programme‟ (SMP) of the EU in 1993 (EU-wide product market reform), and the typical size of an affected industry (columns „Empl‟) measured as the
median percentage share of affected industries in total manufacturing employment (average over 1985-1987) as presented in Buigues et al. (1990). The top
panel of the Table counts the affected industries by country while the bottom panel groups the affected industries by NACE 2-digit industry codes. Based on
the type of pre-existing barriers to competition, the affected industries were divided into six groups; SMP Group 1: High-technology, public-procurement
markets; SMP Group 2: Traditional public-procurement and regulated markets (High price dispersion); SMP Group 3: Traditional public-procurement and
regulated markets (Low price dispersion); SMP Group 4.1: Sectors with moderate non-tariff barriers (Consumer goods); SMP Group 4.2: Sectors with
moderate non-tariff barriers (Investment goods); SMP Group 4.3: Sectors with moderate non-tariff barriers (Intermediate goods). See the Data Appendix for
complete definitions and sources of variables.
SMP Group 3
Table 4
EU ‘Single Market Programme’ (SMP): Industry-Country Pairs Affected by the Reform
SMP Group 4.1 SMP Group 4.2 SMP Group 4.3SMP Group 1 SMP Group 2
(1)                         
OLS                    
robust
(2)                                                                
IV                                             
robust
(3)                                                           
GMM
(4)                                  
GMM           
autocorrelation
(5)                                                        
GMM         
clustered
R&D R&D R&D R&D R&D
Margin -0.079*** -0.465*** -0.505*** -0.465*** -0.512**
(0.014) (0.107) (0.105) (0.106) (0.201)
Sargan statistic - - - 1.622 -
   p-value - - - 0.445 -
Hansen J statistic - 6.893** 6.893** - 2.080
   p-value - 0.032 0.032 - 0.354
N 3,551 3,551 3,551 3,551 3,551
R-squared 0.58 0.39 0.34 0.39 0.34
Partial R-squared - 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.019
F-statistic - 19.58*** 19.58*** 15.06*** 5.89***
   p-value - 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
CapEx CapEx CapEx CapEx CapEx
Margin -0.024** -0.443*** -0.432*** -0.442*** -0.425**
(0.011) (0.124) (0.123) (0.143) (0.193)
Sargan statistic - - - 4.309 -
   p-value - - - 0.116 -
Hansen J statistic - 6.072** 6.072** - 2.531
   p-value - 0.048 0.048 - 0.282
N 7,483 7,483 7,483 7,483 7,483
R-squared 0.45 0.26 0.27 0.26 0.27
Partial R-squared - 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006
F-statistic - 14.82*** 14.82*** 10.61*** 3.66**
   p-value - 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.012
Table 5
First-Stage Regression Statistics: Margin
Note: The sample consists of 101 three-digit NACE manufacturing industries across 10 countries that
participated in the EU „Single Market Programme‟ at its inception in 1993 (see Table 1) over the
period 1995-2004. The dependent variable in the first (second) panel is „R&D‟ („CapEx‟). „Margin‟ is
instrumented using the EU „Single Market Programme‟ variables described in Table 4. The estimated
specifications are as follows: (1) classical linear regression with heteroskedastic-robust standard errors;
(2) instrumental variables (IV) estimator with heteroskedastic-robust standard errors (using Eicker-
Huber-White “sandwich” variance-covariance matrix); (3) feasible heteroskedastic-efficient two-step
generalized methods of moment (GMM) estimator; (4) GMM estimator with autocorrelation-consistent
and heteroskedastic-and-autocorrelation-consistent standard errors; (5) GMM estimator with standard
errors clustered at the country-industry level. Sargan (Hansen J) statistics correspond to tests of
overidentifying restrictions. Partial R-squared is for the EU „Single Market Programme‟ variables in
the first-stage regressions; similarly, F-statistic is the test of the joint significance of these variables in
the first-stage regressions. See the Data Appendix for complete definitions and sources of variables. I
remove outliers by using the 1-to-99 percentile range of the dependent variable. I always control for 3-
digit-NACE industry, country, and year dummies, not shown. Standard errors are reported in
parentheses; *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
First-Stage Regression Statistics: Margin
R&D / Capital Expenditures and Competition
(1)                                            
GMM                       
autocorrelation
(2)                                            
GMM                        
clustered
(3)                                        
GMM                       
autocorrelation
(4)                                                
GMM                             
clustered
(5)                                 
GMM                        
autocorrelation
(6)                                                 
GMM                                
clustered
(7)                                
GMM                          
autocorrelation
(8)                                                      
GMM                               
clustered
R&D R&D R&D R&D R&D R&D R&D R&D
Margin * FD Low -0.552*** -0.557** -0.510*** -0.562*** -0.561*** -0.564** -0.467*** -0.476**
(0.129) (0.225) (0.115) (0.201) (0.136) (0.228) (0.107) (0.212)
Margin * FD High -0.149 -0.157 -0.275 -0.308 -0.144 -0.151 -0.045 -0.058
(0.278) (0.337) (0.234) (0.271) (0.287) (0.344) (0.363) (0.365)
F-test 1.52 2.37 0.82 1.37 1.47 2.34 1.47 2.46
   p-value 0.217 0.124 0.367 0.241 0.225 0.126 0.226 0.117 
Sargan statistic 0.014 - 0.890 - 0.009 - 0.127 -
   p-value 0.906 - 0.346 - 0.923 - 0.722 -
Hansen J statistic - 0.016 - 1.097 - 0.010 - 0.101
   p-value - 0.900 - 0.295 - 0.919 - 0.751
N 3,551 3,551 3,551 3,551 3,551 3,551 3,551 3,551
R-squared 0.47 0.47 0.52 0.49 0.45 0.45 0.49 0.49
Partial R-squared 0.021 0.021 0.025 0.025 0.019 0.019 0.027 0.027
Shea Partial R-squared 0.022 0.022 0.027 0.027 0.019 0.019 0.027 0.027
F-statistic 15.92*** 6.36*** 19.34*** 7.6*** 14.35*** 6.02*** 20.71*** 9.36***
   p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000
Partial R-squared 0.004 0.004 0.005 0.005 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.003
Shea Partial R-squared 0.004 0.004 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.003 0.003
F-statistic 3.21** 3.52** 3.71** 3.89*** 3.34** 3.43** 2.19* 3.63**
   p-value 0.022 0.015 0.011 0.009 0.019 0.017 0.087 0.013
CapEx CapEx CapEx CapEx CapEx CapEx CapEx CapEx
Margin * FD Low -0.662*** -0.727** -0.504*** -0.557** -0.799*** -0.927** -0.461*** -0.583**
(0.219) (0.311) (0.152) (0.224) (0.297) (0.396) (0.168) (0.269)
Margin * FD High 0.228 0.449 -0.171 -0.173 0.081 0.243 0.036 0.121
(0.468) (0.807) (0.294) (0.335) (0.395) (0.704) (0.283) (0.507)
F-test 2.34 1.83 1.11 0.97 2.17 1.83 2.58 2.07
   p-value 0.126 0.176 0.292 0.324 0.141 0.176 0.108 0.150
Sargan statistic 0.867 - 3.382* - 0.786 - 2.966* -
   p-value 0.352 - 0.066 - 0.375 - 0.085 -
Hansen J statistic - 0.312 - 1.971 - 0.269 - 1.250
   p-value - 0.576 - 0.160 - 0.604 - 0.264
N 7,483 7,483 7,483 7,483 7,483 7,483 7,483 7,483
R-squared 0.77 0.71 0.83 0.82 0.75 0.69 0.84 0.81
Partial R-squared 0.006 0.006 0.008 0.008 0.005 0.005 0.008 0.008
Shea Partial R-squared 0.006 0.006 0.009 0.009 0.004 0.004 0.008 0.008
F-statistic 9.78*** 3.36** 13.12*** 4.49*** 7.25*** 2.69** 11.27*** 3.91***
   p-value 0.000 0.018 0.000 0.004 0.000 0.045 0.000 0.009
Partial R-squared 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.003
Shea Partial R-squared 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.003
F-statistic 2.33* 0.68 3.77*** 0.62 3.60*** 0.78 3.77*** 1.04
   p-value 0.072 0.563 0.010 0.602 0.013 0.508 0.010 0.376
Note: The data are the same as in Table 5. The dependent variable in the top (bottom) panel is „R&D‟ („CapEx‟). „Margin * FD Low‟ stands for „Margin‟
variable interacted with 0/1 variable equal 1 for low financial development countries. „Margin * FD High‟ is defined analogously. See Table 2 for definitions
of High/Low financial development country groups. „Margin * FD Low‟ and „Margin * FD High‟ are instrumented using the EU „Single Market Programme‟
variables described in Table 4. The estimated specifications (1), (3), (5), and (7) use the generalized method of moments (GMM) estimator with
autocorrelation-consistent and heteroskedastic-and-autocorrelation-consistent standard errors; specifications (2), (4), (6), and (8) use the GMM estimator with
standard errors clustered at the country-industry level. F-test is the test of the difference of coefficients „Margin * FD Low‟ and „Margin * FD High‟ in the
second-stage regression. Sargan (Hansen J) statistic corresponds to tests of overidentifying restrictions. (Shea) Partial R-squared is for the EU „Single Market
Programme‟ variables in the first-stage regressions; similarly, F-statistic is the test of the joint significance of these variables in the first-stage regressions. See
the Data Appendix for complete definitions and sources of variables. I remove outliers by using the 1-to-99 percentile range of the dependent variable. I
always control for 3-digit-NACE industry, country, and year dummies, not shown. Standard errors are reported in parentheses; *, **, and *** denote
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
First-Stage Regression Statistics: Margin * FD High
First-Stage Regression Statistics: Margin * FD Low
First-Stage Regression Statistics: Margin * FD Low
First-Stage Regression Statistics: Margin * FD High
Table 6
Competition: Financial Development (FD) Full Interaction Specification
Private Credit Market Capitalization Market Value Traded Accounting Standards
Private Credit Market Capitalization Market Value Traded Accounting Standards
(1)                                           
IV                     
robust
(2)                                                  
GMM
(3)                           
IV                        
robust
(4)                                            
GMM
(5)                                 
IV                        
robust
(6)                                           
GMM
(7)                                      
IV                             
robust
(8)                                              
GMM
R&D R&D R&D R&D R&D R&D R&D R&D
(Margin <25pct) * FD Low 1.047*** 1.057*** 1.254*** 1.063** 1.088*** 1.089*** 0.985*** 0.941***
(0.343) (0.338) (0.470) (0.463) (0.361) (0.355) (0.345) (0.331)
(Margin <25pct) * FD High 0.073 0.091 0.109 -0.659 0.058 0.059 -0.108 -0.181
(0.276) (0.255) (0.631) (0.539) (0.297) (0.269) (0.358) (0.319)
F-test 12.48*** 12.61*** 1.75 4.30** 11.21*** 11.62*** 9.43*** 10.29***
   p-value 0.000 0.000 0.186 0.038 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.001
Hansen J statistic 0.029 0.029 5.453** 5.453** 0.000 0.000 0.204 0.204
   p-value 0.866 0.866 0.020 0.020 0.988 0.988 0.652 0.652
N 3,551 3,551 3,551 3,551 3,551 3,551 3,551 3,551
R-squared 0.32 0.31 0.06 0.06 0.26 0.26 0.12 0.15
Partial R-squared 0.014 0.014 0.006 0.006 0.012 0.012 0.009 0.009
Shea Partial R-squared 0.012 0.012 0.005 0.005 0.011 0.011 0.008 0.008
F-statistic 9.31*** 9.31*** 3.67** 3.67** 7.82*** 7.82*** 6.31*** 6.31***
   p-value 0.000 0.000 0.012 0.012 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Partial R-squared 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003
Shea Partial R-squared 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003
F-statistic 3.78*** 3.78*** 4.07*** 4.07*** 3.92*** 3.92*** 4.59*** 4.59***
   p-value 0.010 0.010 0.007 0.007 0.008 0.008 0.003 0.003
CapEx CapEx CapEx CapEx CapEx CapEx CapEx CapEx
(Margin <25pct) * FD Low 1.516** 1.556** 1.774* 1.783* 1.381** 1.417** 0.913** 1.035**
(0.672) (0.670) (1.016) (0.997) (0.566) (0.564) (0.451) (0.442)
(Margin <25pct) * FD High 0.006 -0.006 -2.224 -2.234 0.090 0.089 -0.463 -0.522
(0.249) (0.248) (1.577) (1.565) (0.237) (0.237) (0.481) (0.479)
F-test 5.42** 5.84** 2.80* 2.91* 6.52** 6.96*** 3.40* 4.50**
   p-value 0.020 0.016 0.094 0.088 0.011 0.008 0.065 0.034
Hansen J statistic 0.714 0.714 0.002 0.002 0.563 0.563 1.893 1.893
   p-value 0.398 0.398 0.962 0.962 0.453 0.453 0.169 0.169
N 7,483 7,483 7,483 7,483 7,483 7,483 6,876 6,876
R-squared 0.67 0.66 0.01 0.01 0.68 0.67 0.76 0.73
Partial R-squared 0.002 0.002 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003
Shea Partial R-squared 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.003
F-statistic 3.19** 3.19** 5.30*** 5.30*** 5.54*** 5.54*** 4.13*** 4.13***
   p-value 0.023 0.023 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.006 0.006
Partial R-squared 0.005 0.005 0.001 0.001 0.007 0.007 0.002 0.002
Shea Partial R-squared 0.005 0.005 0.001 0.001 0.006 0.006 0.002 0.002
F-statistic 10.11*** 10.11*** 2.94** 2.94** 11.76*** 11.76*** 4.47*** 4.47***
   p-value 0.000 0.000 0.032 0.032 0.000 0.000 0.004 0.004
Table 7
‘Intense’ Competition: Financial Development (FD) Full Interaction Specification
Private Credit Market Capitalization Market Value Traded Accounting Standards
Note: The Table is analogous to Table 6 except I interact 0 to 25 percent of the „Margin‟ variable. „(Margin <25pct) * FD Low‟ and „(Margin <25pct) * FD High‟ are
instrumented using the EU „Single Market Programme‟ variables described in Table 4. The estimated specifications (1), (3), (5), and (7) use instrumental variables
(IV) estimator with heteroskedastic-robust standard errors (using Eicker-Huber-White “sandwich” variance-covariance matrix); specifications (2), (4), (6), and (8) use
feasible heteroskedastic-efficient two-step generalized methods of moment (GMM) estimator. F-test is the test of the difference of coefficients „(Margin <25pct) * FD
Low‟ and „(Margin <25pct) * FD High‟ in the second-stage regression. Hansen J statistic corresponds to tests of overidentifying restrictions. (Shea) Partial R-squared
is for the EU „Single Market Programme‟ variables in the first-stage regressions; similarly, F-statistic is the test of the joint significance of these variables in the first-
stage regressions. See the Data Appendix for complete definitions and sources of variables. I remove outliers by using the 1-to-99 percentile range of the dependent
variable. I always control for 3-digit-NACE industry, country, and year dummies, not shown. Standard errors are reported in parentheses; *, **, and *** denote
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
First-Stage Regression Statistics: (Margin <25pct) * FD High
First-Stage Regression Statistics: (Margin <25pct) * FD Low
First-Stage Regression Statistics: (Margin <25pct) * FD Low
First-Stage Regression Statistics: (Margin <25pct) * FD High
Private Credit Market Capitalization Market Value Traded Accounting Standards
(1)                                           
IV                     
robust
(2)                                                  
GMM
(3)                           
IV                        
robust
(4)                                            
GMM
(5)                                 
IV                        
robust
(6)                                           
GMM
(7)                                      
IV                             
robust
(8)                                              
GMM
R&D R&D R&D R&D R&D R&D R&D R&D
(Margin >50pct) * FD Low -0.342*** -0.327*** -0.365*** -0.370*** -0.345*** -0.330*** -0.332*** -0.320***
(0.085) (0.074) (0.089) (0.086) (0.085) (0.075) (0.087) (0.075)
(Margin >50pct) * FD High -0.215 -0.194 -0.270** -0.284*** -0.218 -0.198 -0.189 -0.169
(0.186) (0.178) (0.119) (0.099) (0.184) (0.176) (0.205) (0.193)
F-test 0.70 0.76 0.76 0.74 0.68 0.74 0.76 0.87
   p-value 0.404 0.384 0.383 0.391 0.409 0.389 0.383 0.352
Hansen J statistic 0.137 0.137 0.047 0.047 0.139 0.139 0.080 0.080
   p-value 0.711 0.711 0.829 0.829 0.710 0.710 0.778 0.778
N 3,551 3,551 3,551 3,551 3,551 3,551 3,551 3,551
R-squared 0.37 0.40 0.33 0.31 0.35 0.39 0.38 0.40
Partial R-squared 0.020 0.020 0.019 0.019 0.018 0.018 0.020 0.020
Shea Partial R-squared 0.017 0.017 0.018 0.018 0.016 0.016 0.014 0.014
F-statistic 19.5*** 19.5*** 12.79*** 12.79*** 18.56*** 18.56*** 19.71*** 19.71***
   p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Partial R-squared 0.003 0.003 0.006 0.006 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003
Shea Partial R-squared 0.003 0.003 0.005 0.005 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.002
F-statistic 13.05*** 13.05*** 18.45*** 18.45*** 15.12*** 15.12*** 12.14*** 12.14***
   p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
CapEx CapEx CapEx CapEx CapEx CapEx CapEx CapEx
(Margin >50pct) * FD Low -0.444*** -0.447*** -0.399*** -0.397*** -0.509*** -0.511*** -0.366*** -0.378***
(0.136) (0.135) (0.111) (0.111) (0.166) (0.166) (0.133) (0.131)
(Margin >50pct) * FD High 0.052 0.052 -0.106 -0.100 0.009 0.009 0.051 0.050
(0.221) (0.221) (0.129) (0.128) (0.221) (0.221) (0.175) (0.175)
F-test 3.82* 3.86** 3.98** 4.08** 3.28* 3.30* 4.36** 4.63**
   p-value 0.051 0.049 0.046 0.044 0.070 0.069 0.037 0.031
Hansen J statistic 0.062 0.062 1.219 1.219 0.031 0.031 0.314 0.314
   p-value 0.803 0.803 0.270 0.270 0.860 0.860 0.576 0.576
N 7,483 7,483 7,483 7,483 7,483 7,483 6,876 6,876
R-squared 0.74 0.74 0.77 0.77 0.69 0.69 0.79 0.79
Partial R-squared 0.004 0.004 0.005 0.005 0.003 0.003 0.005 0.005
Shea Partial R-squared 0.004 0.004 0.005 0.005 0.003 0.003 0.005 0.005
F-statistic 6.94*** 6.94*** 11.62*** 11.62*** 5.96*** 5.96*** 6.16*** 6.16***
   p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000
Partial R-squared 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
Shea Partial R-squared 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
F-statistic 4.34*** 4.34*** 6.34*** 6.34*** 4.28*** 4.28*** 6.20*** 6.20***
   p-value 0.005 0.005 0.000 0.000 0.005 0.005 0.000 0.000
First-Stage Regression Statistics: (Margin >50pct) * FD Low
First-Stage Regression Statistics: (Margin >50pct) * FD High
Note: The Table is analogous to Table 6 except I interact 50 to 100 percent of the „Margin‟ variable. „(Margin >50pct) * FD Low‟ and „(Margin >50pct) * FD High‟
are instrumented using the EU „Single Market Programme‟ variables described in Table 4. The estimated specifications (1), (3), (5), and (7) use instrumental
variables (IV) estimator with heteroskedastic-robust standard errors (using Eicker-Huber-White “sandwich” variance-covariance matrix); specifications (2), (4), (6),
and (8) use a feasible heteroskedastic-efficient two-step generalized methods of moment (GMM) estimator. F-test is the test of difference of coefficients „(Margin
>50pct) * FD Low‟ and „(Margin >50pct) * FD High‟ in the second-stage regression. Hansen J statistic corresponds to tests of overidentifying restrictions. (Shea)
Partial R-squared is for the EU „Single Market Programme‟ variables in the first-stage regressions; similarly, F-statistic is the test of the joint significance of these
variables in the first-stage regressions. See the Data Appendix for complete definitions and sources of variables. I remove outliers by using the 1-to-99 percentile
range of the dependent variable. I always control for 3-digit-NACE industry, country, and year dummies, not shown. Standard errors are reported in parentheses; *,
**, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
First-Stage Regression Statistics: (Margin >50pct) * FD High
First-Stage Regression Statistics: (Margin >50pct) * FD Low
Private Credit Market Capitalization Market Value Traded Accounting Standards
Table 8
‘Relaxed’ Competition: Financial Development (FD) Full Interaction Specification
Private Credit Market Capitalization Market Value Traded Accounting Standards
(1)                                            
GMM                       
autocorrelation
(2)                                            
GMM                        
clustered
(3)                                        
GMM                       
autocorrelation
(4)                                                
GMM                             
clustered
(5)                                 
GMM                        
autocorrelation
(6)                                                 
GMM                                
clustered
(7)                                
GMM                          
autocorrelation
(8)                                                      
GMM                               
clustered
R&D R&D R&D R&D R&D R&D R&D R&D
(Margin <25pct) * FD Low 1.047*** 1.071 1.254*** 1.040 1.088*** 1.090 0.985*** 0.922
(0.270) (0.664) (0.436) (0.749) (0.285) (0.686) (0.292) (0.612)
(Margin <25pct) * FD High 0.073 0.091 0.108 -0.322 0.058 0.059 -0.108 -0.144
(0.411) (0.561) (0.628) (0.955) (0.429) (0.591) (0.534) (0.711)
F-test 5.44** 3.09* 1.67 1.07 5.13** 2.88* 4.28** 2.45
   p-value 0.020 0.079 0.196 0.301 0.024 0.090 0.039 0.117
Sargan statistic 0.023 - 2.569 - 0.000 - 0.129 -
   p-value 0.878 - 0.109 - 0.989 - 0.720 -
Hansen J statistic - 0.012 - 1.409 - 0.000 - 0.070
   p-value - 0.914 - 0.235 - 0.993 - 0.791
N 3,551 3,551 3,551 3,551 3,551 3,551 3,551 3,551
R-squared 0.32 0.30 0.06 0.15 0.26 0.26 0.12 0.18
Partial R-squared 0.014 0.014 0.006 0.006 0.012 0.012 0.009 0.009
Shea Partial R-squared 0.012 0.012 0.005 0.005 0.011 0.011 0.008 0.008
F-statistic 11.68*** 2.84** 5.21*** 1.59 10.15*** 2.53* 7.44*** 2.83**
   p-value 0.000 0.037 0.001 0.190 0.000 0.056 0.000 0.038
Partial R-squared 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003
Shea Partial R-squared 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003
F-statistic 2.63** 2.29* 1.60 1.39 2.55* 2.59* 2.81** 2.20*
   p-value 0.048 0.078 0.188 0.245 0.054 0.052 0.038 0.087
CapEx CapEx CapEx CapEx CapEx CapEx CapEx CapEx
(Margin <25pct) * FD Low 1.513** 1.673 1.774 1.788 1.379*** 1.515 0.911** 1.139
(0.589) (1.218) (1.125) (1.676) (0.525) (1.016) (0.405) (0.763)
(Margin <25pct) * FD High 0.005 0.006 -2.224 -2.239 0.089 0.105 -0.462 -0.569
(0.321) (0.450) (1.738) (2.666) (0.305) (0.426) (0.502) (0.801)
F-test 5.99** 2.00 2.27 1.03 6.51** 2.41 3.76* 1.84
   p-value 0.014 0.157 0.132 0.311 0.011 0.120 0.053 0.175
Sargan statistic 0.935 - 0.002 - 0.660 - 2.129 -
   p-value 0.333 - 0.964 - 0.417 - 0.145 -
Hansen J statistic - 0.239 - 0.001 - 0.183 - 0.636
   p-value - 0.625 - 0.979 - 0.668 - 0.425
N 7,483 7,483 7,483 7,483 7,483 7,483 7,483 7,483
R-squared 0.67 0.63 0.01 0.02 0.68 0.65 0.76 0.70
Partial R-squared 0.002 0.002 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003
Shea Partial R-squared 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.003
F-statistic 3.98*** 1.08 7.04*** 2.25* 4.9*** 1.92 4.93*** 1.41
   p-value 0.008 0.355 0.000 0.082 0.002 0.124 0.002 0.238
Partial R-squared 0.005 0.005 0.001 0.001 0.007 0.007 0.002 0.002
Shea Partial R-squared 0.005 0.005 0.001 0.001 0.006 0.006 0.002 0.002
F-statistic 9.74*** 5.75*** 1.78 0.86 12.39*** 6.9*** 3.33** 1.37
   p-value 0.000 0.001 0.149 0.460 0.000 0.000 0.019 0.251
Note: The Table is analogous to Table 7 except here I use the generalized method of moments (GMM) estimator with autocorrelation-consistent and heteroskedastic-
and-autocorrelation-consistent standard errors in specifications (1), (3), (5), and (7); the and GMM estimator with standard errors clustered at the country-industry
level in specifications (2), (4), (6), and (8). F-test is the test of difference of coefficients „(Margin <25pct) * FD Low‟ and „(Margin <25pct) * FD High‟ in the second-
stage regression. Sargan (Hansen J) statistic corresponds to tests of overidentifying restrictions. Partial R-squared is for the EU „Single Market Programme‟ variables
in the first-stage regressions; similarly, F-statistic is the test of the joint significance of these variables in the first-stage regressions. See the Data Appendix for
complete definitions and sources of variables. I remove outliers by using the 1-to-99 percentile range of the dependent variable. I always control for 3-digit-NACE
industry, country, and year dummies, not shown. Standard errors are reported in parentheses; *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level,
respectively.
First-Stage Regression Statistics: (Margin <25pct) * FD High
First-Stage Regression Statistics: (Margin <25pct) * FD Low
First-Stage Regression Statistics: (Margin <25pct) * FD Low
First-Stage Regression Statistics: (Margin <25pct) * FD High
Table A.1
‘Intense’ Competition: Robustness to Autocorrelation and Clustering
Private Credit Market Capitalization Market Value Traded Accounting Standards
Private Credit Market Capitalization Market Value Traded Accounting Standards
(1)                                            
GMM                       
autocorrelation
(2)                                            
GMM                        
clustered
(3)                                        
GMM                       
autocorrelation
(4)                                                
GMM                             
clustered
(5)                                 
GMM                        
autocorrelation
(6)                                                 
GMM                                
clustered
(7)                                
GMM                          
autocorrelation
(8)                                                      
GMM                               
clustered
R&D R&D R&D R&D R&D R&D R&D R&D
(Margin >50pct) * FD Low -0.342*** -0.323** -0.365*** -0.376** -0.345*** -0.325** -0.332*** -0.316**
(0.084) (0.148) (0.092) (0.149) (0.085) (0.148) (0.086) (0.149)
(Margin >50pct) * FD High -0.215 -0.186 -0.270* -0.284 -0.218 -0.190 -0.189 -0.166
(0.226) (0.275) (0.149) (0.181) (0.223) (0.273) (0.260) (0.291)
F-test 0.39 0.52 0.38 0.49 0.38 0.51 0.40 0.55
   p-value 0.533 0.473 0.538 0.486 0.539 0.476 0.525 0.457
Sargan statistic 0.028 - 0.015 - 0.028 - 0.016 -
   p-value 0.867 - 0.902 - 0.866 - 0.899 -
Hansen J statistic - 0.036 - 0.015 - 0.037 - 0.021
   p-value - 0.849 - 0.902 - 0.848 - 0.886
N 3,551 3,551 3,551 3,551 3,551 3,551 3,551 3,551
R-squared 0.37 0.41 0.33 0.30 0.35 0.40 0.38 0.41
Partial R-squared 0.020 0.020 0.019 0.019 0.018 0.018 0.020 0.020
Shea Partial R-squared 0.017 0.017 0.018 0.018 0.016 0.016 0.014 0.014
F-statistic 15.27*** 7.14*** 14.59*** 7.86*** 13.79*** 7.07*** 15.19*** 7.32***
   p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Partial R-squared 0.003 0.003 0.006 0.006 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003
Shea Partial R-squared 0.003 0.003 0.005 0.005 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.002
F-statistic 2.33* 3.17** 4.28*** 3.93*** 2.58* 3.54** 2.31* 2.76**
   p-value 0.073 0.024 0.005 0.009 0.052 0.015 0.075 0.041
CapEx CapEx CapEx CapEx CapEx CapEx CapEx CapEx
(Margin >50pct) * FD Low -0.444*** -0.455** -0.398*** -0.441*** -0.509*** -0.521** -0.366*** -0.393*
(0.146) (0.220) (0.128) (0.171) (0.182) (0.248) (0.136) (0.201)
(Margin >50pct) * FD High 0.052 0.069 -0.106 -0.093 0.009 0.020 0.051 0.067
(0.253) (0.482) (0.183) (0.212) (0.254) (0.482) (0.194) (0.381)
F-test 3.05* 1.48 2.61 2.25 2.57 1.31 3.77* 2.04
   p-value 0.081 0.223 0.107 0.134 0.109 0.252 0.052 0.153
Sargan statistic 0.056 - 1.010 - 0.027 - 0.347 -
   p-value 0.812 - 0.315 - 0.870 - 0.556 -
Hansen J statistic - 0.021 - 0.615 - 0.009 - 0.101
   p-value - 0.884 - 0.433 - 0.923 - 0.751
N 7,483 7,483 7,483 7,483 7,483 7,483 6,876 6,876
R-squared 0.74 0.73 0.77 0.75 0.69 0.69 0.79 0.78
Partial R-squared 0.004 0.004 0.005 0.005 0.003 0.003 0.005 0.005
Shea Partial R-squared 0.004 0.004 0.005 0.005 0.003 0.003 0.005 0.005
F-statistic 6.68*** 2.89** 8.59*** 4.11*** 4.96*** 2.34* 6.97*** 3.20**
   p-value 0.000 0.035 0.000 0.007 0.002 0.072 0.000 0.023
Partial R-squared 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
Shea Partial R-squared 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
F-statistic 2.21* 0.71 4.28*** 1.01 2.71** 0.64 3.01** 0.99
   p-value 0.085 0.547 0.005 0.387 0.044 0.588 0.029 0.397
Note: The Table is analogous to Table 8 except here I use the generalized method of moments (GMM) estimator with autocorrelation-consistent and heteroskedastic-
and-autocorrelation-consistent standard errors in specifications (1), (3), (5), and (7); and the GMM estimator with standard errors clustered at the country-industry
level in specifications (2), (4), (6), and (8). F-test is the test of difference of coefficients „(Margin >50pct) * FD Low‟ and „(Margin >50pct) * FD High‟ in the second-
stage regression. Sargan (Hansen J) statistic corresponds to tests of overidentifying restrictions. Partial R-squared is for the EU „Single Market Programme‟ variables
in the first-stage regressions; similarly, F-statistic is the test of the joint significance of these variables in the first-stage regressions. See the Data Appendix for
complete definitions and sources of variables. I remove outliers by using the 1-to-99 percentile range of the dependent variable. I always control for 3-digit-NACE
industry, country, and year dummies, not shown. Standard errors are reported in parentheses; *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level,
respectively.
First-Stage Regression Statistics: (Margin >50pct) * FD High
First-Stage Regression Statistics: (Margin >50pct) * FD Low
First-Stage Regression Statistics: (Margin >50pct) * FD Low
First-Stage Regression Statistics: (Margin >50pct) * FD High
Table A.2
‘Relaxed’ Competition: Robustness to Autocorrelation and Clustering
Private Credit Market Capitalization Market Value Traded Accounting Standards
Private Credit Market Capitalization Market Value Traded Accounting Standards
(1)                                                   
GMM                             
autocorrelation
(2)                                                   
GMM                             
clustered
(3)                                     
GMM                             
autocorrelation
(4)                                                   
GMM                             
clustered
(5)                                     
GMM                             
autocorrelation
(6)                                                   
GMM                             
clustered
(7)                                     
GMM                             
autocorrelation
(8)                                                   
GMM                             
clustered
R&D R&D R&D R&D R&D R&D R&D R&D
Margin -0.864** -0.944** -0.472*** -0.536** -0.478*** -0.546** -0.761** -0.833**
(0.427) (0.372) (0.118) (0.212) (0.120) (0.213) (0.334) (0.324)
Margin * FD 0.620 0.654 0.035 0.077 0.131 0.233 0.647 0.671
(0.642) (0.500) (0.244) (0.236) (0.581) (0.548) (0.695) (0.570)
Sargan statistic 0.687 - 1.611 - 1.580 - 0.867 -
   p-value 0.407 - 0.204 - 0.209 - 0.352 -
Hansen J statistic - 0.918 - 2.038 - 2.023 - 1.174
   p-value - 0.338 - 0.153 - 0.155 - 0.279
N 3,551 3,551 3,551 3,551 3,551 3,551 3,551 3,551
R-squared 0.50 0.46 0.49 0.45 0.49 0.44 0.53 0.49
Partial R-squared 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.019
Shea Partial R-squared 0.010 0.010 0.030 0.030 0.025 0.025 0.021 0.021
F-statistic 15.06*** 5.89*** 15.06*** 5.89*** 15.06*** 5.89*** 15.06*** 5.89***
   p-value 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001
Partial R-squared 0.012 0.012 0.014 0.014 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011
Shea Partial R-squared 0.006 0.006 0.022 0.022 0.015 0.015 0.012 0.012
F-statistic 9.39*** 5.43*** 10.86*** 4.92*** 8.73*** 4.28*** 8.68*** 5.43***
   p-value 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.005 0.000 0.001
CapEx CapEx CapEx CapEx CapEx CapEx CapEx CapEx
Margin -1.408** -1.869* -0.613** -0.610** -0.849** -0.784* -1.740** -1.740**
(0.627) (1.018) (0.276) (0.309) (0.384) (0.415) (0.682) (0.818)
Margin * FD 1.570* 2.031 2.038 2.829 5.992 6.120 3.285** 3.293
(0.898) (1.320) (1.631) (1.818) (3.738) (3.771) (1.600) (2.152)
Sargan statistic 2.871* - 3.683* - 0.762 - 0.001 -
   p-value 0.090 - 0.055 - 0.383 - 0.974 -
Hansen J statistic - 1.773 - 2.160 - 0.398 - 0.000
   p-value - 0.183 - 0.142 - 0.528 - 0.982
N 7,483 7,483 7,483 7,483 7,483 7,483 6,876 6,876
R-squared 0.77 0.70 0.74 0.59 0.60 0.58 0.79 0.79
Partial R-squared 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.005 0.005
Shea Partial R-squared 0.003 0.003 0.006 0.006 0.004 0.004 0.008 0.008
F-statistic 9.91*** 3.21** 9.91*** 3.21** 9.91*** 3.21** 6.95*** 2.16*
   p-value 0.000 0.023 0.000 0.023 0.000 0.023 0.000 0.091
Partial R-squared 0.004 0.004 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002
Shea Partial R-squared 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.004 0.004
F-statistic 6.24*** 1.67 1.18 0.68 1.97 1.00 3.07** 0.82
   p-value 0.000 0.172 0.314 0.564 0.116 0.392 0.027 0.486
Note: The data and the equation specification are analogous to the ones used in Table 5 except here I interact „Margin‟ with continuous measures of financial
development (see Table 2). The dependent variable in the first (second) panel is „R&D‟ („CapEx‟). „Margin‟ and „Margin * FD‟ are instrumented using the
EU „Single Market Programme‟ variables described in Table 4. The estimated specifications (1), (3), (5), and (7) use the GMM estimator with autocorrelation-
consistent and heteroskedastic-and-autocorrelation-consistent standard errors; specifications (2), (4), (6), and (8) use the GMM estimator with standard errors
clustered at the country-industry level. Sargan (Hansen J) statistic corresponds to tests of overidentifying restrictions. (Shea) Partial R-squared is for the EU
„Single Market Programme‟ variables in the first-stage regressions; similarly, F-statistic is the test of the joint significance of these variables in the first-stage
regressions. See the Data Appendix for complete definitions and sources of variables. I remove outliers by using the 1-to-99 percentile range of the dependent
variable. I always control for 3-digit-NACE industry, country, and year dummies, not shown. Standard errors are reported in parentheses; *, **, and ***
denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
Table A.3
R&D / Capital Expenditures and Competition: Financial Development (FD) Continuous Interaction
Accounting Standards
Private Credit Market Capitalization Market Value Traded Accounting Standards
First-Stage Regression Statistics: Margin
First-Stage Regression Statistics: Margin * FD
First-Stage Regression Statistics: Margin * FD
Private Credit Market Capitalization Market Value Traded
First-Stage Regression Statistics: Margin
(1)                                                   
GMM                             
autocorrelation
(2)                                                   
GMM                             
clustered
(3)                                     
GMM                             
autocorrelation
(4)                                                   
GMM                             
clustered
(5)                                     
GMM                             
autocorrelation
(6)                                                   
GMM                             
clustered
(7)                                     
GMM                             
autocorrelation
(8)                                                   
GMM                             
clustered
R&D R&D R&D R&D R&D R&D R&D R&D
Margin <25pct 2.575*** 2.510* 0.764* 0.325 1.154*** 0.823 2.853*** 2.872*
(0.808) (1.365) (0.438) (0.542) (0.393) (0.673) (0.870) (1.570)
(Margin <25pct) * FD -2.757** -2.722* 0.383 0.269 -5.889 -5.909 -4.285** -4.536*
(1.209) (1.639) (1.844) (2.241) (4.816) (5.795) (1.775) (2.614)
Sargan statistic 0.063 - 3.797* - 2.642 - 0.513 -
   p-value 0.801 - 0.051 - 0.104 - 0.474 -
Hansen J statistic - 0.030 - 3.072* - 1.237 - 0.170
   p-value - 0.863 - 0.080 - 0.266 - 0.680
N 3,551 3,551 3,551 3,551 3,551 3,551 3,551 3,551
R-squared 0.29 0.31 0.05 0.50 0.04 0.05 0.41 0.40
Partial R-squared 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005
Shea Partial R-squared 0.009 0.009 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.011 0.011
F-statistic 4.47*** 2.57* 4.47*** 2.57* 4.47*** 2.57* 4.47*** 2.57*
   p-value 0.004 0.054 0.004 0.054 0.004 0.054 0.004 0.054
Partial R-squared 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.003
Shea Partial R-squared 0.005 0.005 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.007 0.007
F-statistic 2.78** 2.57* 1.55 2.02 0.75 0.98 2.63** 2.30*
   p-value 0.040 0.054 0.200 0.109 0.523 0.401 0.048 0.077
CapEx CapEx CapEx CapEx CapEx CapEx CapEx CapEx
Margin <25pct 2.895** 3.518 3.353 3.184 2.237** 2.364 2.496*** 2.905
(1.296) (2.744) (2.777) (3.493) (1.020) (1.888) (0.878) (2.021)
(Margin <25pct) * FD -2.854** -3.516 -12.595 -12.316 -12.978** -13.649 -3.728** -4.329
(1.370) (2.713) (11.063) (13.391) (6.267) (10.802) (1.472) (3.188)
Sargan statistic 2.092 - 0.295 - 0.124 - 2.916* -
   p-value 0.148 - 0.587 - 0.725 - 0.088 -
Hansen J statistic - 0.686 - 0.100 - 0.033 - 0.504
   p-value - 0.408 - 0.752 - 0.857 - 0.478
N 7,483 7,483 7,483 7,483 7,483 7,483 6,876 6,876
R-squared 0.65 0.55 0.65 0.61 0.46 0.41 0.85 0.84
Partial R-squared 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.003
Shea Partial R-squared 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.011 0.011
F-statistic 6.65*** 5.41*** 6.65*** 5.41*** 6.65*** 5.41*** 5.47*** 4.36***
   p-value 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.005
Partial R-squared 0.004 0.004 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003
Shea Partial R-squared 0.002 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.009 0.009
F-statistic 8.03*** 6.40*** 2.83** 3.11** 5.28*** 4.71*** 4.74*** 4.54***
   p-value 0.000 0.000 0.037 0.026 0.001 0.003 0.003 0.004
Note: The data are the same as in Table 5. The dependent variable in the top (bottom) panel is „R&D‟ („CapEx‟). „Margin <25pct‟ stands for 0 to 25 percent of
the „Margin‟ variable, „(Margin <25pct) * FD‟ stands for 0 to 25 percent of the „Margin‟ variable interacted with continuous measures of financial development
(see Table 2). „Margin <25pct‟ and „(Margin <25pct) * FD‟ are instrumented using the EU „Single Market Programme‟ variables described in Table 4. The
estimated specifications (1), (3), (5), and (7) use the GMM estimator with autocorrelation-consistent and heteroskedastic-and-autocorrelation-consistent
standard errors; specifications (2), (4), (6), and (8) use the GMM estimator with standard errors clustered at the country-industry level. Sargan (Hansen J)
statistic corresponds to tests of overidentifying restrictions. (Shea) Partial R-squared is for the EU „Single Market Programme‟ variables in the first-stage
regressions; similarly, F-statistic is the test of the joint significance of these variables in the first-stage regressions. See the Data Appendix for complete
definitions and sources of variables. I remove outliers by using the 1-to-99 percentile range of the dependent variable. I always control for 3-digit-NACE
industry, country, and year dummies, not shown. Standard errors are reported in parentheses; *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level,
respectively.
First-Stage Regression Statistics: (Margin <25pct) * FD
First-Stage Regression Statistics: Margin <25pct
Table A.4
‘Intense’ Competition: Financial Development (FD) Continuous Interaction Specification
Private Credit Market Capitalization Market Value Traded Accounting Standards
Private Credit Market Capitalization Market Value Traded Accounting Standards
First-Stage Regression Statistics: Margin <25pct
First-Stage Regression Statistics: (Margin <25pct) * FD
(1)                                                   
GMM                             
autocorrelation
(2)                                                   
GMM                             
clustered
(3)                                     
GMM                             
autocorrelation
(4)                                                   
GMM                             
clustered
(5)                                     
GMM                             
autocorrelation
(6)                                                   
GMM                             
clustered
(7)                                     
GMM                             
autocorrelation
(8)                                                   
GMM                             
clustered
R&D R&D R&D R&D R&D R&D R&D R&D
Margin >50pct -0.478** -0.485** -0.365*** -0.401** -0.360*** -0.395** -0.449** -0.462**
(0.228) (0.228) (0.098) (0.168) (0.094) (0.162) (0.189) (0.208)
(Margin >50pct) * FD 0.236 0.229 0.083 0.087 0.199 0.205 0.249 0.240
(0.376) (0.315) (0.177) (0.151) (0.407) (0.341) (0.403) (0.342)
Sargan statistic 0.010 - 0.155 - 0.137 - 0.025 -
   p-value 0.919 - 0.694 - 0.711 - 0.873 -
Hansen J statistic - 0.011 - 0.144 - 0.127 - 0.025
   p-value - 0.917 - 0.705 - 0.721 - 0.875
N 3,551 3,551 3,551 3,551 3,551 3,551 3,551 3,551
R-squared 0.35 0.33 0.29 0.21 0.30 0.22 0.36 0.32
Partial R-squared 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011
Shea Partial R-squared 0.013 0.013 0.018 0.018 0.016 0.016 0.028 0.028
F-statistic 8.48*** 3.62** 8.48*** 3.62** 8.48*** 3.62** 8.48*** 3.62**
   p-value 0.000 0.013 0.000 0.013 0.000 0.013 0.000 0.013
Partial R-squared 0.006 0.006 0.011 0.011 0.008 0.008 0.006 0.006
Shea Partial R-squared 0.007 0.007 0.018 0.018 0.013 0.013 0.016 0.016
F-statistic 4.68*** 2.75** 8.41*** 4.36*** 6.68*** 3.15** 4.73*** 2.93**
   p-value 0.003 0.042 0.000 0.005 0.000 0.024 0.003 0.033
CapEx CapEx CapEx CapEx CapEx CapEx CapEx CapEx
Margin >50pct -1.099** -1.293* -0.375** -0.439 -0.339** -0.283 -0.776** -0.783**
(0.501) (0.745) (0.167) (0.281) (0.160) (0.283) (0.324) (0.379)
(Margin >50pct) * FD 1.154 1.332 0.140 0.605 1.702 2.575 1.554 1.500
(0.742) (0.998) (0.883) (1.299) (1.801) (2.403) (1.401) (2.374)
Sargan statistic 0.592 - 4.450 - 4.010** - 0.343 -
   p-value 0.442 - 0.035 - 0.045 - 0.558 -
Hansen J statistic - 0.251 - 1.387 - 1.734 -
   p-value - 0.616 - 0.239 - 0.188 -
N 7,483 7,483 7,483 7,483 7,483 7,483 6,876 6,876
R-squared 0.66 0.59 0.76 0.78 0.78 0.68 0.80 0.82
Partial R-squared 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001
Shea Partial R-squared 0.002 0.002 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.011 0.011
F-statistic 3.16** 1.45 3.16** 1.45 3.16** 1.45 2.22* 1.06
   p-value 0.024 0.226 0.024 0.226 0.024 0.226 0.084 0.363
Partial R-squared 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Shea Partial R-squared 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
F-statistic 1.78 0.60 0.47 0.37 0.48 0.44 0.29 0.10
   p-value 0.149 0.613 0.702 0.775 0.693 0.725 0.833 0.960
Table A.5
‘Relaxed’ Competition: Financial Development (FD) Continuous Interaction Specification
Private Credit Market Capitalization Market Value Traded Accounting Standards
Note: The data are the same as in Table 5. The dependent variable in the top (bottom) panel is „R&D‟ („CapEx‟). „Margin >50pct‟ stands for 50 to 100 percent
of the „Margin‟ variable, „(Margin >50pct) * FD‟ stands for 50 to 100 percent of the „Margin‟ variable interacted with continuous measures of financial
development (see Table 2). „Margin >50pct‟ and „(Margin >50pct) * FD‟ are instrumented using the EU „Single Market Programme‟ variables described in
Table 4. The estimated specifications (1), (3), (5), and (7) use the GMM estimator with autocorrelation-consistent and heteroskedastic-and-autocorrelation-
consistent standard errors; specifications (2), (4), (6), and (8) use the GMM estimator with standard errors clustered at the country-industry level. Sargan
(Hansen J) statistic corresponds to tests of overidentifying restrictions. (Shea) Partial R-squared is for the EU „Single Market Programme‟ variables in the first-
stage regressions; similarly, F-statistic is the test of the joint significance of these variables in the first-stage regressions. See the Data Appendix for complete
definitions and sources of variables. I remove outliers by using the 1-to-99 percentile range of the dependent variable. I always control for 3-digit-NACE
industry, country, and year dummies, not shown. Standard errors are reported in parentheses; *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level,
respectively.
First-Stage Regression Statistics: (Margin >50pct) * FD
First-Stage Regression Statistics: Margin >50pct
First-Stage Regression Statistics: Margin >50pct
First-Stage Regression Statistics: (Margin >50pct) * FD
Private Credit Market Capitalization Market Value Traded Accounting Standards
Industry 15.77 65% 10.10 90% 38.80 62%
(101) (101) (101)
Country 7.19 30% 0.96 9% 23.27 37%
(10) (7) (10)
Year 1.13 5% 0.01 0% 0.60 1%
(10) (10) (10)
Model 24.11 45% 11.16 57% 62.79 52%
Total 54.17 19.48 120.92
N 7,483 3,551 7,483
R-squared 0.44 0.56 0.51
Note: The Table presents three-factor (Industry, Country, Year) ANOVAs of
„CapEx‟, „R&D‟, and „Margin‟ for 10 EU countries that participated in the EU
„Single Market Programme‟ at its inception in 1993 (see Table 1). Numbers in cells
refer to the partial sum of squares while the numbers in parentheses refer to the
number of indicators. Percentages show the fraction of the model's (total) variation
explained by a given factor (model). I remove outliers by using the 1-to-99 percentile
range of the dependent variable. All factors are significant at the 1% level, p-values
not shown. See the Data Appendix for complete definitions and sources of variables.
ANOVAs: EU ‘single-market’ Countries in 1995-2004
Table A.6
MarginCapEx R&D
(1)                                              
OLS                                         
robust
(2)                                              
OLS                                         
robust
(3)                                     
OLS                                     
robust
(4)                                              
OLS                                         
robust
Margin Margin Margin Margin
Affected Industries Classified as SMP Group 1 -0.003 -0.002
(0.004) (0.004)
Affected Industries Classified as SMP Group 2 0.036*** 0.036*** 0.037*** 0.037***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Affected Industries Classified as SMP Group 3 -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.010** -0.010**
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Affected Industries Classified as SMP Group 4.1 -0.013*** -0.013*** -0.014*** -0.014***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Affected Industries Classified as SMP Group 4.2 0.001 -0.001
(0.006) (0.005)
Affected Industries Classified as SMP Group 4.3 -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002** -0.002**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Industry dummies Yes Yes No No
Country dummies Yes Yes No No
Industry-year dummies No No Yes Yes
Country-year dummies No No Yes Yes
F-statistic 8.67*** 12.88*** 7.75*** 11.55***
   p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Partial R-squared 0.008 0.008 0.009 0.009
N 7,483 7,483 7,483 7,483
R-squared 0.52 0.52 0.58 0.58
First-Stage: Competition and the EU ‘Single Market Programme’ (SMP) Instruments
Table A.7
Note: The sample consists of 101 three-digit NACE manufacturing industries across 10 countries that participated in
the EU „Single Market Programme‟ (SMP) at its inception in 1993 (see Table 1) over the period 1995-2004. The
dependent variable is „Margin‟ while regressors are based on the EU „Single Market Programme‟ variables described
in Table 4. The „Affected Industries Classified as SMP Group 1‟ variable is created as follows: First, I take 0/1
variables equal 1 for NACE 3-digit industry-country pairs from the list of „SMP Group 1‟ industries identified (ex
ante) to be affected by the introduction of the EU's „Single Market Programme‟ in 1993 (EU-wide product market
reform). Second, I interact the indicator variables with the percentage share of each affected industry in total
manufacturing employment in each country (average over 1985-1987). The remaining EU „Single Market Programme‟
regressors are defined analogously for „SMP Group 2‟, „SMP Group 3‟, „SMP Group 4.1‟, „SMP Group 4.2‟, and
„SMP Group 4.3‟ industry groups. Partial R-squared is for the EU „Single Market Programme‟ variables; similarly, F-
statistic is the test of the joint significance of these variables. See the Data Appendix for complete definitions and
sources of variables. I remove outliers by using the 1-to-99 percentile range of the dependent variable. In specifications
(1) and (2) I control for 3-digit-NACE industry, country, and year dummies; in specification (3) and (4) I control for 3-
digit-NACE industry-year and country-year dummies, not shown. Standard errors are reported in parentheses; *, **,
and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
Industry-level Variables
VA Industry-country-year-level (period 1995-2004) value-added at factor cost (v12150). Value-
added is the difference between what was produced and what was used as “inputs” by
production. It is the main indicator of the wealth created in a company. Source: Eurostat,
Structural Business Statistics, Detailed data on all enterprises.
CapEx Industry-country-year-level (period 1995-2004) gross investment in tangible goods (v15110)
divided by value-added (VA). Source: Eurostat, Structural Business Statistics, Detailed data
on all enterprises.
R&D Industry-country-year-level (period 1995-2004) total intra-mural R&D expenditure (v22110)
divided by value-added (VA). Total intra-mural expenditures are all expenditures for Research
& Development undertaken within the company, regardless of the source of funds. Source:
Eurostat, Structural Business Statistics, Detailed data on all enterprises.
Margin Industry-country-year-level (period 1995-2004) gross operating surplus (v12170) divided by
value-added (VA). Gross operating surplus is surplus generated by operating activities after
the labor factor input has been recompensed. It is the balance available to the company which
allows it to recompense the providers of funds and debt, to pay taxes, and eventually to
finance all or part of its investment. Income and expenditure classified as financial or
extraordinary in company accounts is excluded from the gross operating surplus. Source:
Eurostat, Structural Business Statistics, Detailed data on all enterprises.
EU ‘Single Market Programme’ Variables
Affected Industries 
Classified as                           
SMP Group 1
First, we take 0/1 variables equal 1 for NACE 3-digit industry-country pairs identified ex-ante
to be affected by the introduction of the EU „Single Market Programme‟ (SMP) in 1993 (EU-
wide product market reform). The list of industries (denoted „SMP Group 1 - High-
technology, public-procurement markets‟) considered is: 322 - Manufacture of television and
radio transmitters and apparatus for line telephony and line telegraphy; 331 - Manufacture of
medical and surgical equipment and orthopaedic appliances. Second, we interact the indicator
variables with the percentage share of each affected industry in total manufacturing
employment in each country (average over 1985-1987). Source: Buigues et al. (1990), Table
26 of statistical Annex, p. XVI.
Affected Industries 
Classified as                               
SMP Group 2
First, we take 0/1 variables equal 1 for NACE 3-digit industry-country pairs identified ex-ante
to be affected by the introduction of the EU „Single Market Programme‟ (SMP) in 1993 (EU-
wide product market reform). The list of industries (denoted „SMP Group 2: Traditional
public-procurement and regulated markets (High price dispersion)‟) considered is: 159 -
Manufacture of beverages; 244 - Manufacture of pharmaceuticals, medicinal chemicals and
botanical products; 282 - Manufacture of tanks, reservoirs and containers of metal;
manufacture of central heating radiators and boilers; 283 - Manufacture of steam generators,
except central heating hot water boilers; 342 - Manufacture of bodies (coachwork) for motor
vehicles; manufacture of trailers and semi-trailers; 352 - Manufacture of railway, tramway
locomotives, rolling stock. Second, we interact the indicator variables with the percentage
share of each affected industry in total manufacturing employment in each country (average
over 1985-1987). Source: Buigues et al. (1990), Table 26 of statistical Annex, p. XVI.
Affected Industries 
Classified as                                 
SMP Group 3
First, we take 0/1 variables equal 1 for NACE 3-digit industry-country pairs identified ex-ante
to be affected by the introduction of the EU „Single Market Programme‟ (SMP) in 1993 (EU-
wide product market reform). The list of industries (denoted „SMP Group 3: Traditional
public-procurement and regulated markets (Low price dispersion)‟) considered is: 155 -
Manufacture of dairy products; 156 - Manufacture of grain mill products, starches and starch
products; 158 - Manufacture of other food products; 311 - Manufacture of electric motors,
generators and transformers; 312 - Manufacture of electricity distribution and control
apparatus; 313 - Manufacture of insulated wire and cable; 316 - Manufacture of electrical
equipment n.e.c.; 321 - Manufacture of electronic valves and tubes and other electronic
components. Second, we interact the indicator variables with the percentage share of each
affected industry in total manufacturing employment in each country (average over 1985-
1987). Source: Buigues et al. (1990), Table 26 of statistical Annex, p. XVI.
Affected Industries 
Classified as                                      
SMP Group 4.1
First, we take 0/1 variables equal 1 for NACE 3-digit industry-country pairs identified ex-ante
to be affected by the introduction of the EU „Single Market Programme‟ (SMP) in 1993 (EU-
wide product market reform). The list of industries (denoted „SMP Group 4.1: Sectors with
moderate non-tariff barriers (Consumer goods)‟) considered is: 181 - Manufacture of leather
clothes; 182 - Manufacture of other wearing apparel and accessories; 221 - Publishing; 223 -
Reproduction of recorded media; 252 - Manufacture of plastic products;297 - Manufacture of
domestic appliances n.e.c.; 323 - Manufacture of television and radio receivers, sound or
video recording or reproducing apparatus and associated goods; 341 - Manufacture of motor
vehicles; 362 - Manufacture of jewellery and related articles. Second, we interact the indicator
variables with the percentage share of each affected industry in total manufacturing
employment in each country (average over 1985-1987). Source: Buigues et al. (1990), Table
26 of statistical Annex, p. XVI.
Table DA.1
Definition of Variables
Affected Industries 
Classified as                                      
SMP Group 4.2
First, we take 0/1 variables equal 1 for NACE 3-digit industry-country pairs identified ex-ante
to be affected by the introduction of the EU „Single Market Programme‟ (SMP) in 1993 (EU-
wide product market reform). The list of industries (denoted „SMP Group 4.2: Sectors with
moderate non-tariff barriers (Investment goods)‟) considered is: 286 - Manufacture of cutlery,
tools and general hardware; 291 - Manufacture of machinery for the production and use of
mechanical power, except aircraft, vehicle and cycle engines; 292 - Manufacture of other
general purpose machinery; 293 - Manufacture of agricultural and forestry machinery; 294 -
Manufacture of machine-tools (split into DK2941, DK2942 and DK2943 in NACE Rev.1.1);
295 - Manufacture of other special purpose machinery; 296 - Manufacture of weapons and
ammunition; 351 - Building and repairing of ships and boats; 353 - Manufacture of aircraft
and spacecraft. Second, we interact the indicator variables with the percentage share of each
affected industry in total manufacturing employment in each country (average over 1985-
1987). Source: Buigues et al. (1990), Table 26 of statistical Annex, p. XVI.
Affected Industries 
Classified as                                      
SMP Group 4.3
First, we take 0/1 variables equal 1 for NACE 3-digit industry-country pairs identified ex-ante
to be affected by the introduction of the EU „Single Market Programme‟ (SMP) in 1993 (EU-
wide product market reform). The list of industries (denoted „SMP Group 4.3: Sectors with
moderate non-tariff barriers (Intermediate goods)‟) considered is: 151 - Production,
processing, preserving of meat, meat products; 171 - Preparation and spinning of textile
fibres; 172 - Textile weaving; 174 - Manufacture of made-up textile articles, except apparel;
175 - Manufacture of other textiles; 193 - Manufacture of footwear; 241 - Manufacture of
basic chemicals; 242 - Manufacture of pesticides and other agro-chemical products; 245 -
Manufacture of soap, detergents, cleaning, polishing; 246 - Manufacture of other chemical
products; 251 - Manufacture of rubber products; 261 - Manufacture of glass and glass
products; 262 - Manufacture of non-refractory ceramic goods other than for construction
purposes; manufacture of refractory ceramic products; 263 - Manufacture of ceramic tiles and
flags; 264 - Manufacture of bricks, tiles and construction products; 315 - Manufacture of
lighting equipment and electric lamps; 332 - Manufacture of instruments and appliances for
measuring, checking, testing, navigating and other purposes, except industrial process control
equipment; 364 - Manufacture of sports goods; 365 - Manufacture of games and toys; 366 -
Miscellaneous manufacturing n.e.c.; 372 - Recycling of non-metal waste and scrap. Second,
we interact the indicator variables with the percentage share of each affected industry in total
manufacturing employment in each country (average over 1985-1987). Source: Buigues et al.
(1990), Table 26 of statistical Annex, p. XVI.
Financial Development Country-level Measures
PCDMBANKOFINSTGDP Private credit by deposit money banks and other financial institutions to GDP. Average over
the period 1990-1994. Source: The World Bank Financial Structure and Economic
Development Database.
STMCAPGDP Stock market capitalization to GDP. Average over the period 1990-1994. Source: The World
Bank Financial Structure and Economic Development Database.
STMTVTGDP Stock market total value traded to GDP. Average over the period 1990-1994. Source: The
World Bank Financial Structure and Economic Development Database.
ACCOUNT Index created by examining and rating companies‟ 1990 annual reports on their inclusion or
omission of 90 items in balance sheets and income statements and published by the Center for
International Financial Analysis & Research, Inc. The maximum is 90 while the minimum is
0. Source: The Center for International Financial Analysis & Research, Inc.
FD High 0/1 variable, equal to 1 if a country has above-median value of financial development among
the 10 countries that participated in the EU's „Single Market Programme‟ at its inception in
1993. „FD High‟ is constructed separately for each financial development measure listed
above. Source: The World Bank Financial Structure and Economic Development Database.
FD Low 0/1 variable, equal to 1 if a country has below-median value of financial development among
the 10 countries that participated in the EU's „Single Market Programme‟ at its inception in
1993. „FD Low‟ is constructed separately for each financial development measure listed
above. Source: The World Bank Financial Structure and Economic Development Database.
